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OKLAHOMA'S ARCHAIC HALF-BLOOD
INHERITANCE STATUTE

-

STILL GOING:*

A PLEA FOR REPEAL
NANCY I. KENDERDINE**

Title 84, section 222 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides:
Kindred of the half-blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood
in the same degree, unless the inheritance come to the intestate by
descent, devise or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all
those who are not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded
from such inheritance.'
At first blush the "half-blood" statute, or, as it is frequently labeled, the
"ancestral property" statute,2 appears to be very logical. As divorce and remarriage
have become common, the number of blended families has greatly increased the

probability that a decedent will have either half-blood siblings or other half-blood

collateral relatives.3 What could be more rational than a statute that keeps the

decedent's inherited property on the side of the family from which it came? If, for
example, decedent was devised real property by her mother, excluding decedent's
paternal half brother from his normal intestate share of this asset will keep that
property in the bloodline.
Further examination, however, reveals that even this most justifiable application
of section 222 can yield irrational results in many circumstances. The statute
completely ignores, for example, the fact that decedent's mother is very likely to
4
have received that property she devised to decedent from decedent's father, who

*

With apologies to the Energizer Bunny.

Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. B.A., 1964, Duke University; J.D.,
1973, University of Oklahoma. The author expresses her appreciation to her 1996 research assistant, Jay
Green, for his help in identifying the current and former half-blood laws of the 50 states.
1. 84 OKLA.STAT. § 222 (1991).
2. See, e.g., In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41, 49 (Okla. 1937).
3. A half-blood relative is one that shares only one common ancestor with the decedent, while a
whole blood relative shares two common ancestors. Thus, two persons with the same mother but
different fathers would be maternal half-blood siblings. The term has no relevance, whatsoever, to lineal
relatives (children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, and the like); it applies only to collateral
relatives. It is very important to realize, however, that while all second line collaterals (aunts, uncles,
cousins and the like) are all related to the decedent only through either the maternal or paternal line, they
are not half-blood relatives since they share two common ancestors - the paternal (or maternal)
grandmother and the paternal (or maternal) grandfather. These second line collaterals are half-blood
relatives only if they share one grandparent with decedent but not the other.
4. Many studies have shown that the surviving spouse is the preferred devisee in the vast majority
of wills of the first spouse to die. Further, under modem intestate succession law, the surviving spouse
will always receive some portion of the property of the first to die, frequently at least half. See generally
**
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was the parent of the half brother being excluded. This is one of several
interpretations of the statute that often reduce section 222 to an illogical absurdity.
When the decedent's surviving relatives are collateral relatives other than merely
whole and half brothers and sisters, the illogical results that can occur when
section 222 is invoked increase dramatically.5
Since 1969, primarily because of the influence of the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC), many states have revised their intestate succession statutes to more
accurately reflect current preferences for distribution of property at death.6 The
repeal of statutes that provided different treatment for half-blood relatives has been
part of this reform movement. In the last twenty-five years, most states, if they
had not already done so, have adopted equal treatment statutes for half-blood
relatives based on the UPC provision.7 These states have recognized that the
inherent bias against half-blood relatives is an anachronistic vestige of the common
law that has no place in modern society.8 They have also recognized that the stilldisputed issues about the proper application of these statutes, as well as the results
that often occur when the statutes are applied, far outweigh any value that these
statutes might have in certain specific instances when they might achieve a result
that some would view as "proper.' 9
Oklahoma, on the other hand, still retains its half-blood statute. The legislature
appears to have been oblivious to the almost universal rejection of these
unworkable statutes. Oklahoma seems to be unaware that the statute is even
controversial. In 1984, the state adopted a modem intestate succession statute that
was clearly based on the UPC provision," yet Oklahoma completely ignored
section 222. As it has been interpreted, section 222 is almost totally incompatible
with the inheritance scheme of the revised statute. Problems that rarely arose when
the half-blood statute was used in connection with the original intestate succession
statute will now occur on a regular basis."

84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B) (1991). The precise share depends on the decedent's relative pattern and,
sometimes, on whether the property was separate or coverture.
5. See infra text -ccompanying notes 163-64.
6. See generally ]Roger W. Anderson, The Influence of the Uniform ProbateCode in Non Adopting
States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 599 (1985).
7. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-107 (1993). See infra note 79 for the list of states currently treating

half-blood relatives equally in all circumstances.
8. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 852.03 historical cmt. (3) (Supp. 1995) (the statute repealed the state's
half-blood statute). See infra Part L.A for a discussion of the common law roots of half-blood statutes.
It is also often pointed cut that these statutes lost their only possible justification when adopted children
(who share no blood) %ere granted full inheritance rights. A further change in the inheritance scheme
that undermines the blood-line justification occurred when the surviving spouse was made a principal
heir-at-law.
9. As will be further explained in infra Part III, as interpreted, the statutes are not true ancestral
property statutes, nor do they necessarily keep the property in the blood line.
10. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 233, § 3, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 852, 854-57 (amending 84 OKLA.
STAT. § 213 (1981), codified as amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1991)).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 252-65.
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The major theme of this article is that section 222 should be repealed. It is the
author's belief that the section is frequently misapplied and often ignored when
estates are distributed,' 2 thus causing unequal treatment of identically situated
heirs. Further, it is a major premise of this article that section 222 is an archaic
common law vestige that seldom accomplishes any valid purpose and frequently
causes results for which there can be no rational justification.
Part I of the article first explores the common law roots of half-blood statutes
in the United States and then examines the wide variety of half-blood statutes that
were, at one time, in effect in this country. Part I[ reviews the current status of
half-blood statutes in the United States. Part H explores the Oklahoma statute in
detail, critically examining both its current interpretations and the large number of
fundamental questions about its application that are still unanswered. Part IV
analyzes the additional problems that occur when section 222 is applied to the
revised Oklahoma intestate succession statute. The article concludes with a plea
to the legislature for the statute's immediate repeal.
L A Brief History of Half-Blood Statutes
A. English Common Law Roots
Under the English common law, succession to realty and distribution of
personalty were governed by separate rules. 3 One difference was the treatment
of half-blood relatives when there were no issue and the property passed to
collateral relatives. Collateral relatives of the half blood were entitled to share in
the distribution of personal property.' 4 However, by about A.D. 1350, collateral
of the half blood were totally excluded from succession to real properrelatives
5
ty.'
Two distinct early common law rules of succession to real property influenced
the design of most half-blood statutes in the United States. The first relevant

12. Although there is no empirical data to support this statement, the author, as a teacher of trusts
and estates law, has been consulted on proper distribution under section 213 for over twenty years. From
the many questions asked, it is very clear that many members of the practicing bar in Oklahoma are not
familiar with the current constructions of section 222, nor do they understand when it does and does not
apply.
13. Personalty was distributed to the next of kin determined by the civil law method. Land
descended to heirs determined by a parentelic system of computation. The latter scheme was further
complicated by rules of primogeniture and a general preference of males over females. See, e.g., 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *212-14, *504. In 1925, the Administration of Estates Act
modernized much of the English inheritance scheme, providing, among other things, that the same
persons would take the realty and personalty. This act also abolished previous gender preferences.
Administration Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (Eng.).
14. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *505.
15. 2 id. at *224. Prior to this time the rights of half bloods were very unsettled. Pollock and
Maitland note that Bracton (mid-1200s) held that the half-blood relation could inherit, although postponed
in favor of the whole blood. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF

ENGLISH LAw 303 (1895). The rule absolutely excluding half bloods das changed in England in 1833.
Inheritance Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 106 (Eng.).
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inheritance rule provided that on failure of issue the property descended to
collateral relative; who were of the blood of the first purchaser, that is, a lineal
descendant of the first purchaser.'6
The first purchaser was the individual who first acquired the estate for his
family other than by descent. 7 Thus, paraphrasing the example given by
Blackstone: 8 if Albert purchased land and it descended first to his son Bob, then
to Bob's son Carl. then, if Carl died without issue, the property had to pass to a
collateral relative who was a lineal descendant of Albert, the first purchaser. The
property could never, under any circumstances, descend to a maternal collateral
relative of Carl -- not even a maternal relative of the whole blood. 9 It also could
not descend to a paternal collateral relative of Carl who was not a lineal
descendant of Albert."0 This was a pure ancestral property rule designed to keep
the property in the direct bloodline of the first purchaser. It applied to both whole
and half-blood relatives and was not per se a half-blood rule.
Blackstone described the ancestral property rule (feudum antiquum) as being
unique to England and Normandy, and he attributed it to the feudal system.2 He
stated that the feudal reason for the rule was "that which was given to a man, for
his personal service, and personal merit, ought not to descend to any but the heirs
of his person."' Pollock and Maitland, on the other hand, rejected the idea that
the rule was of feudal origin, believing instead that "a rule whose main effect is
that of keeping a woman's land in her own family is not unnatural and may be
very ancient."'
Regardless of its origins, this rule of ancestral property created some obvious
problems for the early common law judges. First, if property could only descend
to lineal descendants of the first purchaser, what did one do when the first
purchaser died without issue? Quite clearly, technically, collateral relatives could
not inherit this fevdum novum. While apparently that was, in fact, the outcome in
some very early cases, a method was soon devised which allowed the collateral
relatives to take the inheritance. They were allowed to hold the new estate ut
feudum antiquum, that is, with all the qualities attached as if it were a feudum
antiquum.24
There was a second problem situation: what happened when it was impossible
to establish with certainty who the first purchaser was? According to Blackstone,

16. 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 13, at *220. This restricted definition of "of the blood" would also
disqualify collateral relatives of the first purchaser.
17. 2 id.
18. 2id.
19. 2id.
20. For example, the property could not descend to a lineal descendant of Albert's brother. Under
this fascinating canon cof
descent, the common ancestor could not be more remote than the first purchaser.
This limited definition of "of the blood" may well be connected to another early common law rule of
succession which provided that property would never lineally ascend. See 2 id. at *208.
21. 2 id. at *221.
22. 2 id.
23. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 300.
24. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *221.
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the common law's solution to this problem was to substitute "reasonable proof' for
"impossible proof'; that is, the law required only that the claimant be the "next of
the whole blood to the person last in possession" in those cases in which the first
purchaser could not be traced.' The theory behind this approach was that the
"next of the whole blood" claimant was "very likely" to be in the direct line of the
first purchaser.'
Both of these wonderfully convoluted solutions from the simplistically logical
minds of the early common law judges resulted in situations in which both
maternal and paternal collateral relatives were entitled to inherit the land, subject,
of course, to the same priorities regarding gender, primogeniture, and representation which were inherent in the entire inheritance schemeY
The "reasonable proof' substitute for the identity of the actual first purchaser
of the ancestral property may have given us another legacy. This "rule of proof'
has often been identified as the source of the rule completely excluding half-blood
relatives from the common law scheme of succession.' This is the second
inheritance rule from the common law that has influenced the half-blood statutes.
According to Blackstone, the common law judges who created the "reasonable
proof' rule were applying some early probability theory.29 By definition, whole
blood collaterals share twice as many common ancestors with the decedent as do
half-blood collaterals. Accordingly, the odds that the shared ancestor was the
unknown first purchaser were much greater if inheritance was limited to the whole
blood relatives. This was especially true when, as was frequently the case, the heir
and the decedent were siblings, since whole blood siblings share all ancestors."
The probability that the whole blood ancestor would be of the blood of the first
purchaser was further increased because it was coupled with the common law rule
that those collaterals of the male stock were preferred to those of the female."
Since the relatives on the father's side were admitted ad infinitum before any from
the mother's side, unless the land was proved to have descended from the mother's

25. 2 id. at *228.
26. 2 id.

27. A thorough discussion of the complete inheritance scheme of the common law is beyond the
scope of this article. Blackstone's "seven canons of inheritance" outline the general scheme: (1)
inheritances lineally descend to the issue... ad infinitum, but shall never lineally ascend; (2) the male
issue shall be admitted before the female; (3) where there are two or more males of equal degree, the
eldest only shall inherit; but the females altogether; (4) the lineal descendants of any person deceased
shall represent their ancestor; (5) on failure of issue, the inheritance shall descend to the blood of the first
purchaser, subject to the three preceding rules; (6) the collateral heirs must be his next collateral kinsman
of the whole blood; (7) in collateral inheritances, the male stock shall be preferred to the female...
unless the lands have in fact descended from a female. 2 id. at *208-41 (ch. 14). For further explanation
of the complete operation of these seven canons the reader is referred to the fourteenth chapter of
Blackstone. 2 id.
28. 2 id. at *228, *230.
29. 2 id. at *229.
30. 2 id. at *230, *231, *236.
31. Id. at *234.
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side, the odds were very good that the collateral heir of the whole blood would
actually be of the blood of the first purchaser.32
If the half-blood exclusion had been applied only to the unidentifiable first
purchaser situation, Blackstone's explanation would probably be all that was
needed. However, the exclusion of half-blood relatives was total. Half-blood
collateral relatives simply did not participate in the succession to land under any
circumstances. For example, if Carl were the first purchaser, and he died without
issue, leaving only his half brother David surviving, the property would escheat.3
Even Blackstone admitted that this particular application of the rule went beyond
the principle on which it rested.' He, nevertheless, traced even this prohibition
to the "reasonable proof' rule applied to the feudal ancestral estate.3"
Pollock and Maitland, as they were often inclined to do, disagreed with
Blackstone. They contended that there was nothing in the early feudal scheme that
supported the total exclusion of half-blood relatives. They argued that the
exclusion was not of ancient origin, and that as late as the reign of Edward II
some cases supported the right of half bloods to inherit if there were no whole
blood collaterals. 6 They further noted that German and French customs had a
confusing variety of rules on the rights of half-blood relatives." It was their
contention that thirteenth and fourteenth century English lawyers had no easy
solution to the issue of the rights of half-blood relatives and desired a clear rule,
regardless of its logic." Pollock and Maitland's ultimate justification was simply
that "[o]ur rule was one eminently favorable to the king; it gave him escheats; we
are not sure that any profounder explanation of it would be true."3
Given the propensity of the fourteenth century courts to reify the doctrine of
estates in land, it is easy to visualize their ability to move from the "reasonable
proof' probabilities concept applied to a true untraceable feudum antiquum to the
idea that the same half-blood total exclusion rule should apply to the feudum
novum. The fuedum antiquum was, after all, fictitiously being held as if it were a
feudum antiquum so that the collateral relative could inherit; therefore, the same
rules applied to the feudum antiquum should apply. At the same time, as will be
further discussed in later sections, there is much to be said for certainty and clarity
in the law. While it sometimes yielded irrational results, the rule totally excluding
half-blood relatives from inheritance in all circumstances was exceedingly clear.
Regardless of the true reason for this particular canon of inheritance, it, along with
the ancestral property rule itself, provided the roots from which the large majority
of half-blood statutes in the United States were derived.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

2 id. See also,supra note 27.
2 BLACKSTOIT, supra note 13, at *230.
2 id.
2 id.
2 POLLOCK. & MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 304. Edward II reigned from 1307 to 1327.
2 id. at 303.
2 id. at 305.
2 id.
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B. Inheritanceby Half-Blood Relatives in the United States: TraditionalRules
The common law canon that prohibited half-blood relatives from inheriting
under any circumstances was never really accepted in the United States.' In a
few jurisdictions, half-blood relatives were always treated equally with whole
bloods.' In the majority of jurisdictions, half-blood relatives were treated equally
in most circumstances. It is, however, the exceptions to that general rule which
created the uncertainty and the frequently illogical results which have plagued the
law of collateral inheritance for nearly two hundred years.
The American situation was perhaps best summarized by Chancellor Kent when
he stated that the laws "are so different from each other that they seem to be the
result of accident or caprice rather than the dictates of principle."43' Kent also
noted that "the laws on this ...are not constant but exposed to the restless love
of change which seems to be inherent in American policy .... ."' Because of the
constant change noted by Chancellor Kent, as well as the endless variations of
interpretation on certain details, it is impossible to summarize a traditional
American approach. However, several major statutory patterns were prevalent.
1. Pure Half-Blood Statutes
Six states traditionally gave the half-blood collateral relatives one-half as much
as the whole blood relatives." This particular approach is unique in that it applies
to all property of the decedent, real and personal, regardless of how or from whom
it was acquired. This rule is usually said to be of Scottish origin, although its
earliest roots were probably in the civil law.'
Two additional states, Kansas and Louisiana, had statutes that achieved a result
that was very similar to the one-half as much provisions in that the half-blood

40. See generally, e.g., Cook v. Hammond, 6 F. Cas. 399, 403 (C.C.D. Mass. 1827). Prior to the
American Revolution, many of the colonies' charters provided that the common law of descents would
prevail. During this early period, the issue of whether the prohibition against inheritance by half bloods
was part of this tradition was frequently debated with inconsistent results. Even in more modem times,
those jurisdictions which rely on the common law of descents to fill in the holes in their statutory scheme
have found this issue to be unclear. As a result, early in their history most states adopted statutes
modifying the common law rights of half-blood relatives.
41. See, e.g., id. at 403.

42. See, e.g., Lynch v. Lynch, 64 P. 284 (Cal. 1901) (the term 'brothers and sisters' and other terms
denoting kindred must be held to include those of the half as well as the whole blood when used without
limitation).
43. 4 JAMEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 406 (John Gould ed., 14th ed. 1896).

44. 4 id.
45. See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.105 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.050 (Baldwin 1947); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 474.040 (1985); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 41 (West 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-2 (Michie
1995); W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3e (1849) (repealed 1992). These six states' statutes specifically provided

that the half-blood relatives received half as much as the whole bloods.
46. E.g., THOMAS E. ATKINSON, THE LAW OF WILLS 52 (2d ed. 1953). Almost all modem treatises
attribute this approach to ancient Scottish law. All treatises cite as their authority, Crooke v. Watt, 23
Eng. Rep. 689. 690 (1690). In Crooke v. Watt, the reporter does mention that one attorney commented
that this was the approach in Scotland, but no authority is given. Id.
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relatives would receive a lesser percentage of the estate than the whole bloods, at
least among first line collateral relatives. For collateral inheritance, both states, by
slightly different methods, first split the estate into two equal shares and sent one
share down each line (maternal and paternal).' Whole blood relatives related
through both sides would take from both sides; half-blood relatives would take
only from the side through which they were related, unless there were no relatives
in the other line.
In nine states, either always or under certain circumstances, half-blood relatives
were postponed in favor of whole blood relatives.48 Under this rule, whole blood
relatives and their issue took the estate to the exclusion of any half-blood relatives;
however, unlike at common law, the half-blood relative took if there were no
whole bloods.
There were several different variations of this general postponement concept.
For example, in Mississippi the rule was applied only when the whole and half
bloods were in the same degree.49 In several other states, half-blood sisters and
brothers and their issue were postponed in favor of whole blood brothers and
sisters and their issue, but the half blood in this group would take before more
remote parentelic "next of kin" of the whole blood." Several eastern states
applied the postponement rule to property acquired by purchase but applied an
exclusionary rule when the property was "ancestral.'"' Early Georgia law
incorporated into its half-blood postponement scheme the common law rule that
the paternal line was preferred to the maternal line. At one time, Georgia treated
all paternal collateral relatives equally when the property was not ancestral;
however, the half bloods in the maternal line were postponed. 2
2. Ancestral PropertyExceptions
As previously mentioned, several states that postponed the half-blood relatives
when the property was acquired by purchase also totally excluded those collaterals
who were not of the blood from sharing in property that the decedent had

47. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-508 (1991); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 893 (West 1991). This scheme
did not always result in the half blood receiving half as much. For example, among first line collaterals
(brothers and sisters and their issue), if there were only one whole blood relative and one half blood
maternal relative, the whole blood relative would take three-fourths of the estate (the entire paternal onehalf and one-half of the maternal share). Among second line collaterals (aunts, uncles, and their issue),
the shares of the whole and half-blood relatives would be equal unless the statute further divided the
property.
48. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-276 (1958) (repealed 1987); DEL. REV. CODE § 3731 (1935)
(repealed 1959); GA. CODE § 3931 (1910) (repealed 1931); MD. CODE ANN. art. 93, § 131 (1943)
(repealed 1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-5 (1984); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 3:3-5 to -7 (1937) (repealed
1977); 1910 OHIO GEN. CODE § 8677 (repealed 1932); Pa. Act of 1933, §§ 6, 9 (repealed 1917); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-107 (1976) (repealed 1990).
49. MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-5 (1984).
50. E.g., DEL. REv. CODE § 3731 (1935). This is the rule adopted in England under a series of
reforms that culminated in the Administration of Estates Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (Eng.).
51, These states included Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
52. GA. CODE § 3931 (1910) (repealed 1931).
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inherited. Most of the states with this pattern had statutes that kept the inherited
property on the maternal or paternal side from which it came, and whole blood
relatives not of the blood would be excluded as well as half-blood relatives.' In
that respect, this particular statutory scheme closely tracked the common law
ancestral property rule from which it was derived.
The primary difference in this ancestral property approach and the common law
rule that applied to the feudum antiquum was the rejection by most states of the
first purchaser concept. The property was considered ancestral if it came to the
decedent by devise, descent, or gift from a relative. The collateral heir had only
to be of the blood of the relative from whom the decedent directly acquired the
property; how or from whom the relative acquired it was irrelevant.' The second
major difference was that half-blood relatives who were of the blood could
participate, although they were sometimes postponed in favor of the whole bloods.
Arkansas, which had a very complex inheritance pattern, had an ancestral
property statute that always kept inherited property in the line from which it
came." Arkansas was among a small minority that-continued to trace this
property to the first purchaser."
3. Combined Ancestral Property - Half-Blood Statutes
The most prevalent approach to the rights of half-blood relatives in this country
was some form of a statute that treated the half-blood relatives equally with the
whole bloods unless the property was "ancestral."' In the case of ancestral
property, the statute excluded those half bloods who were not of the blood of the
ancestor." These statutes are a hybrid combination of two separate common law
canons of inheritance: the common law ancestral property rule and the common
law prohibition against inheritance by half-blood relatives.59 The attempt to
combine these two distinct canons resulted in statutes that, as interpreted by the

53. See supra text accompanying note 51.
54. E.g., Delaplaine v. Jones & Searing, 8 N.J.L. 340, 343 (Sup. Ct. 1826).
55. See generallyARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-141 to -147 (1947) (repealed 1969); see also Kelly's Heirs
v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 556 (1855).
56. Cupp v. Frazier's Heirs, 387 S.W.2d 328, 329 (Ark. 1965).
57. Under the common law definition of the feudum antiquum, the property was acquired by
purchase unless it descended to the heir. This was later expanded to include property that was devised
to the recipient in the same share that he would have received through descent. If the property was given
to the decedent during his lifetime, it was not treated as "ancestral property." The "ancestral property"
statutes in the United States apply to any real property acquired by the decedent from a relative either
by inter vivos gift, devise, or descent. Additionally, in this country the statutes were usually interpreted
to refer to the relative from whom the decedent directly acquired the property; we do not look to the
"first purchaser." But see supra text accompanying note 56. Nevertheless, this type of American statute
is generally referred to as an "ancestral property statute," just as the English canon of inheritance was
labeled an ancestral property rule.
58. E.g., 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991).
59. See generally supra Part I.A.
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courts, frequently neither kept inherited property in the bloodline nor prohibited the
half-blood relatives who were not of the blood from taking.'
The language of these combination statutes varied greatly, but two models were
common. The first model, which is the older of the two types, appears to be an
adaptation of the ancestral property statutes used by the several eastern states that
had both an ancestral property statute and a separate half-blood statute addressing
property acquired by purchase." The Tennessee statute, now repealed, was typical
of this pattern:
(3) [W]here the land came to the intestate by gift devise or descent
from a parent, or the ancestor of a parent, and he dies without issue (a) If he have brothers or sisters of the parental line of the half
blood, and brothers or sisters of the maternal line of the half blood,
then the land shall be inherited by such brother or sister on the part of
the parent from whom the estate came, in the same manner as by
brothers and sisters of the whole blood, until the line of such parent is
exhausted of the half blood to the exclusion of the other line.'
The second, newer model, which can be traced back through the Territorial Civil
Code of 1877,' is exemplified by the Oklahoma statute:
Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood
in the same degree, unless the inheritance come to the intestate by
descent, devise or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all
those who are not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded
from such inheritance.64
This particular model was adopted in more states than any other half-blood or
ancestral statute. At one time, it was in effect in sixteen states.' It is also the

60. See generally infra Part III.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52. The particular states with the two separate statutes
are among the earliest admitted to the Union, and these statutes represent one of the very earliest
statutory modifications of the total prohibition of the common law. These would appear to be the states

that, prior to adopting their statutes, had struggled most frequently with the half-blood prohibitions under
the English common law. Their two separate statutes combine to impose stricter limitations on the
inheritance rights of half-blood relatives than most other states; however, when viewed in their historical
prospective, they repre:.ent a major reform.
62. TENN. CODE § 8380 (1934) (repealed 1977).
63. DAKOTA TERR:. CIV. CODE § 778 (1877). See the discussion of the origin of this model in In
re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 866-67 (N.D. 1968).
64. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991).
65. See ALA. CODE § 43-3-5 (1975) (repealed 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-145 (1947) (repealed
1969) (Arkansas is unique among these jurisdictions in that it also had a pure ancestral property statute);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 254 (1931) (repealed 1983); HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:2-107 (1984); Mictt. COMP.
LAWS ch. 243 (1897) (rP.pealed 1981); MINN. STAT. § 8992-29 (1938) (repealed 1985); MONT REV. CODE
§ 91-403 (1947) (repealed 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2307 (1947) (repealed 1974); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 134.160 (1990); N.Y. Dec. Est. § 90 (1920) (repealed 1929); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-12 (1970)
(repealed 1973); 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29-1-13 (Michie 1984) (repealed
1995); UTAH CODE AttN. § 75-2-107 (1953) (amended 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.035 (1965);
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statute that has been most litigated, and it represents the type of statute that has
produced the most controversy. Cogent arguments have been made that the statute:
(1) always excludes the half-blood relatives not of the blood' and, conversely,
only excludes half-blood relatives in the same degree as the whole blood
relatives;' (2) only excludes the half blood in the same degree as the actual
whole blood claimante and, conversely, excludes even when the whole blood is
more remote but is claiming by representation through one in the same degree;'
(3) only operates when there are whole blood claimants 0 and, conversely,
excludes half bloods not of the blood when the only other claimants are half
bloods of the blood of the ancestor;71 (4) only excludes half bloods not of the
blood and never excludes whole bloods not of the blood' and, conversely, also
excludes whole blood collaterals who are not of the blood of the ancestor;' (5)
operates only when the half-blood relatives are in the same statutory inheritance
class preference as the whole bloods74 and, conversely, excludes the half bloods
in favor of whole bloods in a lesser inheritance class;' and (6) only excludes half
bloods not of the blood when there is some heir of the blood76 and, conversely,
excludes the half blood not of the blood in favor of whole bloods not of the
blood.'
These combination-type statutes, especially those of the Oklahoma type, are the
statutes that were most often labeled by the unfortunate courts faced with the task
of interpreting them as "without reason" and in need of repeal." Finally, in the
1970s, many legislatures began to hear the pleas for reform.
I. Current Status in the United States
Today, in all but twelve states, half-blood relatives inherit equally with whole
blood relatives under all circumstances.79 Of the remaining twelve states, seven

Wis. STAT. § 237.03 (1967) (repealed 1969).
66. See Amy v. Amy, 42 P. 1121 (Utah 1895).
67. See In re Smith's Estate, 63 P. 729, 730 (Cal. 1901).
68. See Estate of Nidever v. Binkley, 5 Cal. Rptr. 343, 355 (Ct. App. 1960).

69. See id.
70. See generally Thompson v. Smith, 227 P. 77, 80 (Okla. 1924) (the effect of limiting the statute
to same degree situations is that the statute doesn't apply "where the decedent leaves half brothers or
sisters, but no full brothers or sisters"). See also infra text accompanying notes 225-40.
71. In re Ryan's Estate, 133 P.2d 626, 632 (Cal. 1943) (dictum only).
72. See DeRoin v. Whitetail, 312 P.2d 967, 970 (Okla. 1957).
73. See In re Wortmann's Estate, 177 N.W. 967, 967 (Mich. 1920).
74. See McDonnall v. Dwarz, 3 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Minn. 1942).
75. See In re Little, 721 P.2d 950, 958 (Wash. 1986).
76. See In re Edwards' Estate, 259 P. 440, 441 (Cal. 1927).
77. Cf. In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41, 44 (1937) (the statute is triggered by the presence of a halfblood relative not of the blood).
78. E.g., DeRoin v. Whitetail, 312 P.2d 967, 975 (Okla. 1957) (Halley, J., dissenting).
79. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-46 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.035 (Michie 1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 14-2107 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-213 (1987); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6404 (West 1983); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-107 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-439 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 506
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are those whose statutes give the half-blood relatives a lesser percentage than the
whole blood relatives, usually one-half as much."0
It is the author's belief that this lesser percentage pattern has survived the
widespread attack on half-blood statutes both because of its clarity and ease in
application and also because it is based on a simple logic that the other statutes did
not possess. The underlying premise of this particular type of statute is that a
collateral relative who shares only one common ancestor with the decedent is not
related to the decedent to the same extent as a relative of the same degree who
shares two common ancestors with the decedent. The statute avoids all the
controversies inherent in the hybrid ancestral property statutes.8'
Since both the nature and source of the property are irrelevant under this pattern,
it does not produce the illogical result of excluding half-blood relatives in favor
of whole blood reTatives who are also not of the blood of the ancestor." It

(1959); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-2 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-107 (1971); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1.
(West 1980); IND. CODE § 29-1-2-5 (1953); IOWA CODE § 633.219 (1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 2-107 (West 1979); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 1-204 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
190, § 4 (1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.109 (1991); MINN. STAT. § 534.2-107 (1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-117 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2307 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (1974)
(statute actually silent concerning half bloods; however, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled in
Prescott v. Carr,29 N.F. 453 (1854), that the statute made no distinction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-7
(West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-107 (Michie 1975); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1
(McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-3 (1959); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-07 (1973); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Baldwin 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.095 (1969); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2104 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1-1 (1956) (the statute is silent; however, they are equal by case
law, Doar v. Doar, 6 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1929)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-107 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29A-2-107 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-107 (1977); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-107 (1975), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 552 (1947)); W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3 (1992); Wis.
STAT. § 852.03 (1993); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-104 (Michie 1979).
80. See FLA. STAT. § 732.105 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-508 (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 391.050 (Banks-Baldwin 1990); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 893 (West Supp. 1996); Mo. Rv. STAT.
§ 474.040 (1990); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 41 (West 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-2 (Michie 1990).
Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia all provide that the half-blood relatives take one-half
as much. The other two states are Kansas and Louisiana. They are not true one-half-as-much
jurisdictions; they have been included among these states since the effect of their statutes is to give a
lesser percentage to the half-blood relatives, at least among first line collaterals. See supra note 47. The
Kansas statute is actually silent as to half-blood relatives; the Louisiana statute states:
The property that devolves to the brothers or sisters is divided among them equally, if
they are all born of the same parents. If they are born of different unions, it is equally
divided between the paternal and maternal lines of the deceased: brothers and sisters fully
related by blood take in both lines and those related by half-blood take each in his own
line ....
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 893 (West Supp. 1996).
81. See supratext a:companying notes 66-78. See also infra Part Ill, for a more detailed discussion
of these problems.
82. The sole except on to this statement is, of course, the fact that adopted children are now treated
equally with birth childrn. The argument is sometimes made that this change in treatment of adopted
children undermines the last remaining reason for any distinctions based on blood. It is clearly an
incongruity in the half-blood statutes. However, there are valid reasons for treating the adopted child
equally that do not rest on preserving the blood line. When this is the only argument against the halfblood statutes, it does not seem to carry the weight it carries when coupled with the other cogent
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addresses only the heirs' relation to the decedent. It is certainly simple to apply
and would be properly and equally applied in all estates in which there are halfblood relatives. Based on the dearth of case law involving the statutes from these
jurisdictions, they would appear to be fairly noncontroversial, unlike their ancestral
property and hybrid cousins.'
Of the other five states that retain some half-blood relative distinctions,
Oklahoma, Hawaii, Nevada, and Washington still have the hybrid combination
statutes.' Mississippi continues to follow its scheme of postponing half-blood
relatives in the same degree in favor of whole blood relatives.'
Although a few states have always treated half-blood relatives equally' and a
few others have done so for many years,' it has been in the last twenty-five years
that most states repealed their half-blood statutes and replaced them with statutes
providing for equal treatment. The influence of the UPC provided much of the
impetus for this widespread reform. Many states adopted verbatim the UPC
provision that "relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit
if they were of the whole blood."8
In those states that were the vanguard of the reform movement, which provided
the precedents for the UPC provision, two different justifications for repeal were
frequently mentioned. One rationale was the absurd, illogical results often reached
under the hybrid statutes. 9 The second justification was the change that had
occurred in the law regarding the inheritance rights of adopted children. When
adopted children, who obviously shared no blood with the decedent, were accorded
full rights, this was viewed as a further indication that the "ancestral property"
limitations on half-blood collaterals were an archaic anomaly in present day
society?
Unfortunately, while most states were seeing the logic of these and other
arguments and adopting equal treatment statutes, Oklahoma remained oblivious to
the whole debate. The pleas for reform that had been sounded in several Oklahoma

arguments against retaining the confusing Oklahoma type half-blood statute.
83. The half-as-much statutes, admittedly, do not solve the "adopted relatives are treated equally,
even though they share no blood" argument, which has frequently been raised against half-blood statutes.
But see supranote 82.
84. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:2-107 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 134.160 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 11-04-035 (1967). The history of the Washington statute is
unique in American jurisprudence. Washington went from "no distinction" in its 1854 statutes to an
ancestral property type statute in 1945. The legislature adopted a "no distinction" statute in 1965 but
repealed it and replaced it with the current ancestral property statute before it ever became effective. See
In re Little, 721 P.2d 950, 954-55 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), for further clarification of the Washington
experience.
85. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-5 (1990).
86. Massachusetts, for example, has treated half-blood relatives equal to whole blood relatives since
1748. The provision is now codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 190, § 4 (1991).
87. Georgia, for example, adopted its equal treatment statute in 1931. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-2

(1985).
88. UNIP. PROBATE CODE § 2-107 (1990).
89. E.g., In re Ryan's Estate, 133 P.2d 626, 629-30 (Cal. 1943).
90. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 852.03, cmt. 3 (1991).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

-

[Vol. 49:81

cases and articles nearly forty years ago were not renewed. 9 Even when the
Oklahoma intestate succession statute was "modernized" in 1984,' the separate
half-blood statute was ignored, and it remains intact.
I1. The Oklahoma Approach to Inheritance by Half-Blood Relatives
Oklahoma has consistently been among those jurisdictions that interpret their
general intestate statutes to include both whole blood and half-blood relatives. In
the absence of some special limiting statutory provision, whole blood and halfblood collaterals share equally in section 213 distributions.'
In 1916, the court in Hill v. Hill' emphatically adopted the California position
that the terms "brothers and sisters" and "next of kin" used in the statute of descent
and distribution "include[] those of the half blood as well as those of the whole
blood."95 In In re Robbs Estate, the latest important half blood case in Oklahoma,
the fact that half blood relatives are within the purview of section 213 is
affirmed.' The couit in Robbs stated that the rule was of feudal origin and had
no place in Oklahoma law unless the legislature had specifically dealt with the
issue.'
The one special limiting statute in Oklahoma is title 84, section 222. As
discussed in Part I of this article," this is the combination-type statute that
includes elements of the common law ancestral property doctrine and elements of
the common law rule regarding inheritance by half-blood relatives. The Oklahoma
statute, like its counterpart in other jurisdictions, has been subject to all the
questions about proper application that are raised by the attempt to combine two
separate doctrines into one limiting statute.
A. The History of Section 222
The current Oklahoma half-blood statute has always been part of the state's
inheritance law.' The Oklahoma territorial legislature adopted the identical statute
for use in the Oklahoma Territory, and it became part of the Oklahoma state law
under the Enabling Act." Prior to statehood, an almost identical statute, which
was part of the law of Arkansas, was in force in that part of Oklahoma that was
then the Indian Territory.''

91. E.g., In re Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Okla. 1972) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
92. Act of May 29, 1984, eh. 233, § 3, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 852, 854-57 (codified as amended
at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1991)).
93. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1981) (amended 1984) (preserved as 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(A) (Supp.
1995)).
94. 160 P. 1116 (Okla. 1916).
95. Id. at 1116 (citing In re Smith's Estate, 63 P. 729 (Cal. 1901)).
96. Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1229.
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 57-77.
99. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991) (originally codified as R.L. § 8427 (1910)).
100. Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 13, 34 Stat. 275.
101. Organic Act of 1890, § 31, 26 Stat. 94-96.
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The language of section 222 was originally drafted as part of the Field Code."°
The Field Code was the basis for the Territorial Civil Code of 1877, which, in
turn, was adopted by South Dakota."3 The South Dakota statutes and the
Territorial Civil Code were adopted by several other states. According to the
Oklahoma court, the statutes came to Oklahoma directly from California; history,
however, does not support that conclusion."
One major premise of this article is that the Oklahoma court's interpretation of
several key provisions of section 222 has left us with a statute that has no rational
basis. The circuitous history of the Oklahoma statute has frequently been relevant
in the court's interpretation of section 222, and, in the author's opinion, this fact
has contributed to some of the illogical results.
While recognizing that the statute came originally from South Dakota, 5 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has tended to give great weight to California
interpretations. The court has relied on the general rule of statutory construction
that a state that adopts a statute from another jurisdiction is presumed to have also
adopted that state's construction of its statute."° Even when rejecting a California
construction, the court has felt obliged to justify its rejection." In subsequent
cases involving the same issue, the later court has carefully scrutinized the
justifications for rejecting California and has often used its disagreement with those
justifications as the basis for overruling the earlier case. As a result, rather than
exercising its independent judgment and deciding for itself the better reasoned
construction, the court has appeared to decide many of these questions on the
collateral question of which state's rules Oklahoma should be following.
This collateral debate has been exacerbated by frequent references in the early
cases to the Arkansas law, which was in effect in the Indian Territory.' While
the Arkansas half-blood statute was very similar to section 222,"° Arkansas also

102. In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41, 48 (Okla. 1936).
103. COMP. LAWS OF DAKOTA § 3410 (1887). The origin of the statute is traced in Thompson v.
Smith, 227 P. 77, 79-81 (Okla. 1924).
104. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in several cases states that the Oklahoma statutes were adopted
directly from California. E.g., Thompson, 227 P. at 81. The Organic Act that established the Oklahoma
Territory, however, states that the laws of Nebraska were to be in effect. Organic Act of 1890, § 11, 26
Stat. 87. These statutes were carried into statehood under the Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335,
§ 13, 34 Stat. 275.
105. Thompson, 227 P. at 79.
106. Id. at 81.The more familiar the author becomes with the legislative process, the more she
doubts the validity of this rule of construction, at least in the situation in which an entire code is being
"borrowed" from another state. In her cynical opinion, we are very fortunate if the legislature has even
read the statute, let alone understands its interpretation. Additionally, there is the unanswered question
of exactly how the California statutes were adopted when the enabling act specified the laws of Nebraska.
See supra note 104.
107. Thompson, 227 P. at 81, 82. The court justifies the rejection on the basis of two exceptions
to the general rule of construction: when the construction is contrary to well-defined state policy and
when the identical statute exists in many jurisdictions and the construction is contrary to the weight of
authority.
108. See, e.g., id. at 80.
109. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-112 (1947) (repealed 1969).
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had, at the time, a separate statute that kept ancestral property in the bloodline."'
The total, complex Arkansas scheme was very different from the general
Oklahoma inheritance scheme. The court was not always careful to make certain
that the Arkansas precedent being discussed actually dealt with the half-blood
statute rather than the ancestral property statute or the combination of the two."'
Once again, in subsequent cases, these differences could always be emphasized and
used to justify overruling prior constructions of the language of section 222. The
collateral issue clouded the picture, even when the prior construction had really
been reached by independent analysis."
A third historical collateral issue has further complicated the interpretation of
section 222. Many of the early Oklahoma cases dealt specifically with the issue
of whether an individual allotment of a member of a Native American tribe was
an "ancestral estate" governed by section 222."' Answering that particular
question involved only a construction of the meaning of the "come to the decedent
by descent, devise or gift from some one of his ancestors" language of the statute.
Unfortunately, these allotment cases were also the first to address many of the
other elements of the statute such as, for example, whether the statute excluded all
half-blood relatives not of the blood or only those in the same degree as the whole
blood relatives."" The allotment issue, if the property was determined to be
ancestral, was irrelevant to the degree question, which involved construction of a
different phrase in the statute."5 However, in In re Estate of Robbs,"6 in which
the Oklahoma court overruled the prior holding in Thompson on the degree question,.17 the court emphasized the fact that the Thompson case had involved an
allotment. The court stated: "[Tihis court's decisions construing our half blood
statute were perhaps unduly influenced by the Indian allotments question which
was usually presented in the same cases (there being more reason to preserve the
Indian allotment in the Indian bloodline)."' 18
In fact, in Robbs, all three of the justifications that the court used to overrule
Thompson were collateral to the question of the better interpretation of the statute

110. Id. § 61-110 (repealed 1969).
111. See Thompson, 227 P. at 81 (discussing Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555 (1885)
(involving construction of both the Arkansas ancestral property statute and the half-blood statute)).
112. Compare Thompson, 227 P. at 80 (determining that the California rule places an artificial
construction upon the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent) with In re Estate of Robbs,
504 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1972) (holding that the conclusion in Thompson rejecting California law was
erroneous).
113. See, e.g., In r,Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. 946 (Okla. 1930); Zweigal v. Lewis, 281 P. 787
(Okla. 1929); Gray v. Chapman, 243 P. 522 (Okla. 1926); Thompson v. Smith, 227 P. 77 (Okla. 1924);
Hill v. Hill, 160 P. 1116 (Okla. 1916).
114. See Thompson, 227 P. at 81.

115. The degree issue involves construction of the first phrase of section 222, i.e., "kindred of the
half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree"; the allotment issue turns
merely on whether the property came to decedent from an "ancestor." See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991).
116. 504 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1972).
117. Id.
at 1231.
118. Id. at 1232.
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given its purpose. In addition to the allotment rationale, the Robbs court listed as
its reasons both the fact that the court in Thompson had mistakenly interpreted
California precedent in rejecting the California rule and the fact that the court in
Thompson was mistaken in thinking that the Arkansas statute was "identical in
material parts."'1

9

Nowhere in the opinion did the court in Robbs address Justice

Kennamer's analysis in Thompson of the two constructions of the degree language,
nor did the Robbs court refute Justice Kennamer's independent conclusion that the
California interpretation was illogical.
B. The Current Constructionof Section 222
1. Property Covered by the Statute
The only property whose distribution will ever be affected by section 222 is real
property that the decedent acquired by descent, gift, or devise from an ancestor.
Frequently, the normal intestate distribution under section 213 of even this
"ancestral" property will not fall under section 222 because the other requirements
of that statute are not met. However, if the specific property does not fall within
the "ancestral" definition, further analysis is unnecessary."2 The property is then
distributed solely on the basis of section 213, and half-blood relatives share equally
with whole blood relatives.
There are three separate elements involved in the question of whether the
property is potentially affected by section 222. First, Oklahoma has always
accepted the majority interpretation that the statute only applies to real property.' This interpretation is based both on the historical origin of the rule treating
half-blood relatives differently' " and on a construction of the language of the
statute itself. "Descent" and "devise" are terms that traditionally applied only to
real property." Second, the decedent must have received the property either by
intestate succession or by devise in a will or by inter vivos gift."2 If the decedent
purchased the property, it is not section 222 property. Third, the property must
have been received from an "ancestor."'' 2
The requirement that the property must have come to the decedent from an
"ancestor" is the first trap in the statute for the unwary. The term, as used in
section 222, does not refer merely to a lineal ascendant of the decedent nor does
it refer merely to any relative who was of an earlier generation." For section
222 purposes, an ancestor is any blood relative of the decedent."v Accordingly,
brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, nephews and nieces, and issue are all

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Thompson, 227 P. at 80.
See In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41, 50 (Okla. 1936).
See supra text accompanying notes 26-39.
In re Ryan's Estate, 133 P.2d 626, 634 (Cal. 1943).
Long's Estate, 67 P.2d at 51.
Id.
Id. at 44, 51.
Id. at 44.
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"ancestors" under section 222. As the Oklahoma court stated in Long's Estate,
"[t]o accomplish the purpose of such statutes, grandsons have frequently been held
the ancestors of their grandfathers . . . ."" If the decedent inherited the property
from anyone other than his or her spouse, it will be covered by section 222.
Spouses, since they are not blood relatives, are not "ancestors."'" Additionally,
if the property was either devised to the decedent by a nonrelative or given inter
vivos to the decedent by a nonrelative, it, along with property which the decedent
purchased,would not be within the purview of the statute.
The nature of the property that is covered by section 222 has been, with one
exception, the least controversial part of the statute. The one exception was the
question of whether individual allotments to members of Native American tribes
were "ancestral" within the meaning of the statute. The Oklahoma rule since 1930
has been that the allotment, when the decedent is the original allottee, is not
covered by the statute."' Obviously, once the allotment has passed by inheritance
or devise to the heir or devisee of the original allottee, the property would fit
under section 222; the controversy over the allotment arose only when the original
allottee died.
Prior to 1930, Oklahoma had held that such property was within the purview of
section 222. In Hill v. Hill,'3' in 1916, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
accepted the reasoning applied by the United States Supreme Court in a case which
arose in Indian Territory and as decided under Arkansas law.' In McDougal v.
McKay, the Court had admitted that the allotted land was actually neither
purchased nor inherited from a parent, and it did not actually fit under either
provision of the Arkansas statutes.' The Court concluded that the property had
come to the allottee.s from'their "tribal parents," and that, by analogy, it could fit
under the ancestral rule." The Court further stated that Congress' purpose (in
adopting the allotment scheme) would be served by treating the allotment as
ancestral.'35 The Oklahoma court in Hill actually felt that the issue was "well1316
settled.'
If the issue was well settled in 1916, it was very unsettled in 1930. In a series
of cases culminating with Yahola's Heirship, the Oklahoma court rejected the rule
that the property was ancestral in the hands of the original allottee, In Yahola's

128. Id.
129. ld at 51. The Long's Estate case contains an excellent explanation of the reason that a spouse
is not considered a relatLve or "ancestor" under most inheritance statutes and also contains an excellent
historical explanation of many of the factors involved in section 222. See id. at 47-5 1.
130. In re Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. 946, 949 (Okla. 1930).
131. 160 P. 1116 (Okla. 1916), overruled by In re Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. 946 (Okla. 1930).
132. McDougal v. McKay, 237 U.S. 372 (1915).
133. Id. at 384, 385.
134. Id.
135. Id at 385. McDougal is extensively discussed in Hill, 160 P. at 1117, and Yahola's Heirship,
285 P. at 947.
136. Hill, 160 P. at 1117.
137. See Yahola's Heirship,285 P.2d at 949. This case is often cited as the case in Oklahoma that
changed the allotment rule; and it did expressly overrule the Hill case. However, the court also
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Heirship, the court refused to expand section 222 by using the analogy of the tribal
parent; instead, the court based its decision on the very technical fact that this
allotment could not have come to the decedent by descent from his parents because
they were still alive.'38
In rejecting the inclusion by analogy argument, the court stated a rule that has
often been used to limit the application of section 222 and its counterpart in other
states. The court said: "[Wihere property would be cast upon a member of a
certain class save and except for a definite exception made by statute, it is
necessary that the facts justifying such exception must be specific and certain and
not be merely analogous thereto .....'"" Since the Yahola's Heirship decision,
the rule that the property is not ancestral property in the estate of the original
allottee has been consistently followed without further legal debate."4
In the author's opinion, however, the concern that Native American allotments
will ultimately pass to persons not of the original allottee's blood is one factor that
may have stifled a movement to repeal section 222. This argument was made to
4
the author in 1987 in a discussion with several Native American law students.' '
Clearly, after the property is inherited from the original allottee by his or her issue,
it would be section 222 property when those successors died. The students'
position was that section 222 was the only law that helped keep the property in the
Native American bloodline.
While the goal of keeping the allotments in the Native American bloodline is
both understandable and meritorious, section 222 will seldom assist in accomplishing this goal. As will be further demonstrated below, 4 1 at least five
factors totally dilute that desired effect: (1) the statute does not exclude whole
blood collateral relatives who are not of the blood of the ancestor; (2) the statute
does not prevent non-Indian spouses from inheriting and then subsequently passing
the property to their heirs; (3) the statute does not exclude half-blood relatives who
are not of the blood of the ancestor if they are a closer degree of relation than
relatives of the blood; (4) the ancestor whose blood they must share will not
necessarily be either the original allottee or someone of his blood; and (5) adopted
children, who share no blood, are never excluded.
If there is a need to address the unique subject of allotted land, a special statute
applying only to allotted land that is still in the bloodline is needed. Such a statute
would need to address, among other problems, the five limiting factors that prevent

mentioned earlier Oklahoma cases that had rejected the allotment rule established by Hill E.g., McKay
v. Roe, 219 P. 921 (Okla. 1923).
138. Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. at 948.
139. Id.
140. No reported cases since Yahola have addressed the allotment issue.
141. Informal discussion in Spring 1987 at the University of Oklahoma College of Law on the need
to repeal section 222 between the author and the late Professor Joseph Rarick, a recognized authority on
Indian property law (taking the repeal position), and several Native American law students from the
university (defending the statute because of the allotment issue).
142. See infra Part III.
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section 222 from achieving the goal. There is no justification for retaining section
222 for this purpose.
2. Who Is the Relevant Ancestor?
Oklahoma has never followed the "first purchaser" rule of the common law.
Oklahoma has always held that the ancestor referred to in the section 222 phrase
"all those who are not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded," is the
immediate ancestor from whom the decedent received the property."' How, or
from whom, that proximate ancestor received the property is of no importance.
This interpretation is consistent with the construction applied by the vast majority
of jurisdictions in this country.'"
This interpretation, which is the only legitimate way to read the clear language
of the Oklahoma statute, leads to the first of many examples of why the statute
often causes results which have no possible rational basis:
Adam marries Belle, and they have a child, AB. Adam dies, leaving all his
property in his will to Belle. Subsequently, Belle marries Carl, and they have two
children, BC and RD. Belle dies intestate. One-fourth of the property she received
from Adam will go to Carl, and one-fourth will go to each of her children: BC,
BD, and AB (it is not ancestral property at Belle's death because a husband is not
an ancestor).' Carl dies intestate. All of Carl's property, including the onefourth interest in the property he received from Belle, will go to his children, BC
and BD. If BC then dies without issue, AB will be able to share in the distribution
of the one-fourth interest BC received from Belle (she is a half-blood sister of the
blood of Belle). However, AB cannot share in the one-eighth interest in the
property that BC received from Carl (she is not of the blood of Carl, the
immediate ancestor from whom BC inherited the property). All of BC's interest
that was received from Carl will go to BD. The fact that the property originally
came to Carl from AB's mother, Belle (who, in this example, actually received it
from AB's father, Able), is irrelevant. Even more ironically, if Carl had a child of
a previous marriage, that paternal half-blood sibling would share with BD.'"
In today's society, as numerous studies have shown, the surviving spouse is the
preferred devisee of most married decedents." 7 The spouse is also the primary
heir under modem intestate succession schemes." 8 Thus, it is quite probable that

143. E.g., Gray v. Chapman, 243 P. 522, 523 (Okla. 1926), overruled on other grounds by In re
Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. 946 (Okla. 1930).
144. See supra te.t accompanying note 54.
145. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(1)(d) (Supp. 1994).
146. This example is not as convoluted as it may seem at first glance. The deaths are all in the
natural generational orCer in which they would be expected to occur. Additionally, the pattern of leaving
all property by will to the surviving spouse is very typical. Finally, the majority of people in this country
still die intestate.
147. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distributionat Death and
Intestate Succession Lars in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 319, 348-364.
148. Compare, e.g., 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(1) (Supp. 1995) (surviving spouse gets at least half
of the estate under mo.t circumstances even when there are issue) and UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102
(1991) (surviving spou;e gets at least the first $200,000 and three-fourths of the rest of the estate even
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property that was devised to, or inherited by, the first spouse to die will go to the
surviving spouse; the survivor then becomes the "ancestor from whence it came"
in later successions. The true common law ancestral nature of the property is
already lost.
This one factor, the modern preference for the surviving spouse, may in fact
prevent the half-blood statute from achieving its original purpose more often than
any other factor. Clearly, if the alleged purpose of section 222 is to keep the
property in the bloodline from whence it came, this statute does not achieve that
purpose. The bloodline from whence it came can change with each generation.
The definition of "ancestral property" under section 222 is far removed from the
common law "ancestral estate."'" 9
If the rmodern" purpose is to keep the property in the bloodline for at least one
generation, the statute achieves that goal only when there are half-blood collateral
relatives. Even then, as will be discussed in the next subsection, the purpose is
only sometimes achieved.
3. The Relatives Affected by Section 222
There are several different issues concerning exactly which relatives can be
excluded by section 222. Some of these issues have been addressed in the
Oklahoma cases; others, although never specifically addressed, have fairly clear
answers, at least inferentially. A third group of questions that are very relevant to
the proper application of section 222 have never been addressed.
a) Decided Questions .
(1) Whole Blood Relatives Are Never Excluded
First, and perhaps most important, given the alleged "ancestral" purpose of the
statute, section 222 only affects the inheritance rights of half-blood relatives. It
never operates to exclude whole blood collateral relatives who are not of the blood
of the ancestor." Thus, if Dee dies owing real property that she inherited from
her father and her only surviving relatives are some paternal and maternal cousins
of the whole blood, the property will descend one-half to the maternal cousins and
one-half to the paternal cousins under section 213." Even though the maternal
cousins are not of the blood of the father, they are whole blood collateral relatives
because they share two common ancestors with Dee (the maternal grandfather and
the maternal grandmother)." 5 Section 222 does not come into play.
In DeRoin v. Whitetail,'53 the argument was made that section 222 should also
exclude the maternal whole blood collaterals not of the blood, either always or at

when there are issue) with 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(A) (Supp. 1995) (the traditional scheme where spouse
gets only one-third if there is more than one child).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
150. DeRoin v. Whitetail, 312 P.2d 967, 972 (Okla. 1957).
151. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(2)(d) (Supp. 1995).
152. See supra note 3.
153. 312 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1957).
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least when there were some half-blood relatives in the picture to trigger the
application of section 2 2 2 ." 4 (In the above example, if Dee also had a half-blood
maternal cousin, he would be excluded by section 222, even though the whole
blood maternal cousins were not excluded. Further, if there were a half-blood
paternal cousin, the statute would at least be triggered by his presence, even
though he would not be excluded because he is of the blood of the father. The
argument in DeRoin was that whole bloods not of the blood should always be
excluded; but, if not always excluded, the presence of the half bloods would
trigger section 222, and then whole bloods not of the blood would be excluded).
The court in DeRoin rejected both arguments. 55
Relying on California precedent and decisions from several other jurisdictions
with identical statutes, 156 the court in DeRoin adopted the construction that the
phrase "all those who are not of the blood" referred only to the subject of the
statute, i.e., "kindred of the half blood."'57 The court rejected the argument
vigorously supported by the dissent that "all those" referred to the entire first
phrase of the statute, i.e., "kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of
the whole blood," and, accordingly, would exclude both groups.'
The basic difference in the rationale of the majority and dissent in DeRoin, other
than a disagreement over the literal subject of the statute, appears to be the result
of an underlying difference of opinion about the nature of the statute and its
primary purpose. The dissent views the statute as an ancestral property statute,
designed to keep ancestral property in the bloodline.' The majority accepts the
view of the Wisconsin court in In re Estate of Kirkendall," from which they
quoted extensively that:
[I]ts leading controlling principle is not that an ancestral estate shall
descend only to those who are of the blood of the ancestor from whom
it came, but it is that, where no other provision is made, the same shall
descend to the next of kin of the intestate, whether of the blood of
6
such ancestor or not. '
The Wisconsin court goes on to conclude that the only other provision made is the
limitation which applies only to the kindred of the half blood not of the blood of
the ancestor.
The DeRoin debate is another clear indication of the problem with the Oklahoma
combination-type statute. Even the court cannot agree on what its fundamental

154. Id. at 972-73.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 971-72 (citing In re Pearsons' Estate, 42 P. 960 (Cal. 1895); Caffee v. Thompson, 81 So.
2d 358 (Ala. 1955); li re Estate of Kirkendall, 43 Wis. 167 (1877)).
157. Id. at 970.
158. Id. at 975 (Halley, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 974-75 (Halley, J., dissenting).
160. 43 Wis. 167 (1877).
161. DeRoin, 312 P.2d at 971 (quoting In re Estate of Kirkendall, 43 Wis. 167 (1877)).
162. Estate oJ'Kirkendall,43 Wis. at 167, 168, quoted in DeRoin, 312 P.2d at 970, 971.
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purpose really is. As a result of the interpretation adopted in DeRoin, it fails
miserably as a statute designed to keep ancestral property in the bloodline, if in
fact that was its purpose. Further, the only thing it often does accomplish is
discrimination against half-blood relatives for no rational reason. As Justice Halley
pointed out in his dissent in DeRoin, "[I]t is unreasonable to think that the
Legislature intended to adopt a statute that would put a grandfather ahead of a
decedent's half brother when clearly the half brother carried more of the blood of
the decedent than did the grandfather.""x That was the result on the facts in
DeRoin, and neither the grandfather nor the half brother were related to the
ancestor from whom the decedent inherited the property.
If there is some rational basis for a statute that bars a half-blood relative not of
the blood, while at the same time allowing a whole blood collateral not of the
blood to share in the property, this author is too dense to see it.
Clearly, if the statute were limited to first line collaterals - brothers and sisters
and their issue - the particular problem of whole bloods not of the blood would
not occur. The only persons not of the blood of the ancestor would have to be
half-blood siblings related through the other line. In that case, the statute would
have a rational basis, even though possibly an outdated purpose when one
considers that adopted children are not of the blood, yet they share equally.
If one ignores the separate problem caused by the abandonment of the first
purchaser rule," 4 an argument can even be made that there is a modem justification for such a statute despite the equal treatment of adopted children - if
it were limited to first line collaterals. Given today's many blended families, such
a statute would keep the property within the'family from whence it came, if not
the bloodline.
However, section 222 is not limited to first line collaterals. In today's society,
the child with no siblings is much more common than he was historically. The
occasions when second line collaterals will inherit continue to increase accordingly.
Increased inheritance by second line collaterals will only increase the opportunity
for the totally unjustifiable section 222 exclusion of half-blood relatives not of the
blood in favor of whole blood relatives not of the blood. When there are so many
different situations in which the statute discriminates for no reason, the fact that
the statute will sometimes work as it was intended is not a sufficient justification
for its continued existence.
(2) Half-Blood Relatives of the Blood Are Never Excluded
Half-blood relatives who are related through the line of the ancestor from whom
the decedent received the property always inherit along with whole blood
relatives." The only half-blood relatives ever excluded by section 222 are those
who are not of the blood of the ancestor.

163. DeRoin, 312 P.2d at 975 (Halley, J., dissenting).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
165. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991).
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This is one of the few certainties of section 222, and it has never really been
disputed. Regardless of whether the statute is viewed as an enabling statute that
confers inheritance rights on the half-blood relatives in derogation of the common
law rule or whether it is viewed as limiting their equal inheritance rights that are
inherent in section 213, the language of the statute is clear in this regard. The only
limit applies only to persons Who are not of the blood of the immediate ancestor."
(3) Half-Blood Relatives in a NearerDegree of Relationship than the Whole
Bloods Are Not Excluded
The one most significant Oklahoma case interpreting section 222 is In re Estate
of Robbs," which was decided in 1972. In the Robbs case, the property in
question was paternal ancestral property; the surviving relatives were a maternal
half brother, the children of deceased maternal half brothers and sisters, and whole
blood paternal cousins.' The trial court and court of appeals excluded the
maternal half-blocd relatives on the authority of section 222 as it had been
construed in Thompson v. Smith"' and In re Long's Estate.' Those cases held
that section 222 always excluded half-blood relatives not of the blood of the
ancestor.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Robbs held that the statute disqualified halfblood heirs not of the blood only when they were in the same degree of
relationship to the deceased as the whole blood relatives." If the whole blood
relative is more remote, the half-blood relative is not excluded. Accordingly, in
Robbs, the maternal half-blood relatives were not excluded because they were
second and third degree relations compared to the fourth degree paternal
cousins."
In the Robbs decision, the court determined that the Oklahoma court had erred
nearly fifty years before in Thompson when the court rejected the California
construction that the Robbs decision adopts." The court, accordingly, overruled
that portion of Thompson, and later cases that had restated the Thompson holding,
which applied section 222 to all half-blood relatives not of the blood.'75
166. E.g., DeRoin, 312 P.2d at 971; In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41, 43 (Okla. 1936); Zweigel v.
Lewis, 281 P. 787, 791 (Okla. 1929).
167. 504 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1972).
168. Id. at 1129.
169. 227 P. 77 (0da. 1929).
170. 67 P.2d 41 (Okla. 1937).
171. See id. at 43; Thompson, 227 P. at 81.
172. Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1232. Although most Oklahoma cases speak of the relationship
between the "whole blcod relatives" and the "half blood relatives," it is clear from the context that the
complete comparison they are making is between whole-blood relatives and half-blood relatives of the
blood on the one hand and half-blood relatives not of the blood on the other hand. See, e.g., DeRoin, 312
P.2d at 970; Hill v. Hill, 160 P. 1116, 1116 (Okla. 1916).
173. Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1230.
174. See supra te~t accompanying note 118. The California case limiting its identical statute to
same degree situations was In re Smith's Estate, 63 P. 729 (Cal. 1901) (per curiam).
175. Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1231. Specifically mentioned in addition to Thompson was In re
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Five brief examples will demonstrate the impact of the Robbs limitation on
section 222. In each example, the property was devised to the decedent, D, by his
mother:
(1) D is survived by his whole brother, A, and his paternal half brother, B. A
will take the property to the exclusion of his half brother B because they are both
second degree relations of D and B is not of the blood of the mother.
(2) D's relatives are his whole blood nieces, C and E (the children of deceased
brother A), and his paternal half brother, B. B will share in the distribution of the
maternal property. Although he is not of the blood of the mother, B is a closer
degree of relation (2nd) than the nieces (3rd). Section 222 does not apply.
(3) D's relatives are two whole blood nieces and two paternal half-blood nieces.
The paternal half-blood nieces are excluded because they are not of the blood of
the mother, and they are the same degree of relation as the whole blood nieces.
(4) D's relatives are a maternal uncle and a paternal half brother, B. B will take
the property under section 213. He is not excluded by section 222 because he is
a closer degree of relation (2nd) than the uncle (3rd).
(5) D's relatives are a maternal whole blood uncle and two paternal half-blood
nieces (the children of his deceased half brother). The nieces will be excluded by
section 222 because they are the same degree of relation as the uncle.
The key difference in the Thompson and Robbs approaches is in the construction
of the meaning of "in the same degree" in the first phrase of section 222, which
reads in its entirety: "[K]indred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the
whole blood in the same degree ... ."76 Unfortunately, in overruling Thompson,
as Justice Jackson pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Robbs, the court spent
its time "interpreting former decisions of this court as distinguished from
interpreting the statute."'
The majority opinion carefully discussed exactly how the earlier court erred
both in refusing to accept the California interpretation and in following Arkansas
construction.Y7 The majority even enlightened us on the "correct" way to
construe the Arkansas statute while, ironically, admitting that Arkansas has not so
79
construed its statute.

Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41 (0kla. 1936).
176. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991).
177. Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1232 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1231. See supra text accompanying note 119.
179. Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1231-32. The Arkansas statute contained an additional phrase not
present in the Oklahoma statute. Section 61-112 of the 1947 Arkansas Code read in relevant part:
"Relatives of the half blood shall inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree; and
descendants of such relatives shall inherit in the same manner as the descendants of the whole blood,
unless .... ARK. CODE ANN. § 61-112 (1947) (repealed 1969) (emphasis added). The Oklahoma court
thought that the exception in the Arkansas statute applied "only to the descendants of the half blood
relations, not the half blood relations themselves." Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1233. This logic(?) by
the Oklahoma court, perhaps more than anything else in the Estate of Robbs case, undermines the entire
decision. If anything, that additional phrase further emphasizes the fact that the purpose of the "same
degree" language was not to limit the statute's applicability to same degree situations.
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However, nowhere in the opinion is there any discussion that would help the
reader understand why the majority felt that the California interpretation was the
more rational construction of the statute. Further, the majority does not even
attempt to refute the very rational analysis of the purpose of the same degree
language that the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Long's Estate used to affirm the
Thompson ruling on the issue." One can only assume either that the court found
the California cou-t's reasoning in Smith's Estate very persuasive, or else the court
felt bound by California precedent.
In In re Smith's Estate,"' the California court read the entire first phrase of its
identical statute as defining the heirs to whom the statute applied, i.e., half-blood
relatives in the same degree as whole blood relatives." The effect was to turn
their statute into a postponement statute rather than an exclusion statute. The
California rule is one of two common constructions of the statute.
The second construction, which results in always excluding the half-blood
relatives not of the blood, is discussed in both Thompson and Long."' This
approach reasons that the first phrase of the statute is merely a reiteration of the
general inheritance right provided in section 213. "The words preserve the same
equality of distribution" as is provided under the general inheritance law;M the
second phrase of the statute then states the exception. Under this view, "all those
not of the blood" refers to the subject of the statute, which, it will be recalled, the
court in DeRoin found to be "kindred of the half blood." The court in DeRoin
rejected the argument that the entire first phrase defined the subject of the
statuteYU
It is interesting that the court in DeRoin determined that the subject of section
222 was only kindred of the half blood, while the court in Robbs implicitly, by
relying on the Smith's Estate case, made the entire first phrase part of the
definition of the subject to which the limitation applies. It would seem that the
subject of the statute can change depending on the issue that the court is
addressing.
Two important factors that have been consistently overlooked by the courts of
both California and Oklahoma in the construction of the first phrase of the statute
are the location of the half-blood statute within the general arrangement of the
probate code and the circumstances existing at the time the statute was drafted.
The half-blood statute is not a subsection of the general inheritance statute, nor
does it immediately follow the general statute. Rather, it immediately follows five
sections that deal with the definition and proper method of calculating degrees of
kindred." The immediately preceding section codifies the rule for calculating

180. The court in Long's Estate stated that the Thompson case "correctly refused" the California
construction. Long's Estate, 67 P.2d at 43.
181. 63 P. 729 (Cal. 1901) (per curiam).
182. Id. at 730.
183. See Long's Estate, 67 P.2d at 43; Thompson, 227 P. at 80.
184. Long's Estate, 67 P.2d at 43.
185. DeRoin, 312 P.2d at 970. See aLso supratext accompanying notes 153-57.
186. 84 OKLA. STAT. §§ 217-221 (1991).
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collateral degrees."s The organization of the Territorial Code was such that it
reflected a natural progression through the various topics in the subject of
succession.
When examined in the broader context of its location within the Code, it is very
easy to conclude that the first phrase of section 222 was designed to clarify the
idea that half-blood relatives usually were treated just like whole blood relatives
under the Code unless the property was ancestral. The only persons who ever
inherit equally under the traditional succession pattern are those in the same
degree. 8 Having just explained how degrees are determined, the Code goes on
to say in effect, "and this includes half blood relatives unless ......
While it is true that some jurisdictions had always held that the common law
prohibition against half-blood relatives was not part of their law, even in the
absence of a statute," 9 this was certainly not a universal rule. The issue was very
much in doubt in many jurisdictions at the time the Territorial Code was
drafted." The model for section 222 could well have been intended by the
drafters of the original statute as an enabling statute that would settle the question
once and for all.
It is one thing to "have always held" that half-blood relatives are covered by the
general inheritance statute; thus, they do not need section 222 to "enable" them to
take. 9 ' It is quite another thing to attribute that interpretation and intention to the
drafters of the statute. When one is trying to construe the meaning of a "borrowed"
statute that existed prior to the existence of the construing state, perhaps one
should concentrate more on the purpose of the language from the perspective of
the drafters. The original statute was drafted in an environment that did need a
statement giving half blood relatives equal inheritance rights.
If the original intent was not to create an "enabling" statute, perhaps the drafters
at least meant it to be a "clarifying" statute that would end the debate in any state
adopting the code. One must consider the wide variety of treatment of half-bloods
that existed at the time, including statutes that gave the half-blood relatives onehalf as much."9 It would be truly ironic if a phrase designed solely to clarify the
issue has, instead, been the source of most of the conflicts over the meaning and
purpose of the half-blood statute.

187. The subject of section 221 is: "Collateral degrees, how reckoned."
188. The original version of section 213 refers several times to relatives in the same degree and their
right to share equally. In the context of the inheritance statute, it is clear that the language is being used
to change the common law rule that inheritance in more remote generations was always by representation
through the root ancestor (classic per stirpes), even when all were in the same degree. For example, prior
to the 1984 amendment, section 213 (first) stated in part that, "ifthere be no child of the decedent
living ....the remainder goes to all of his lineal descendants; and if all the descendants are in the same
degree... they share equally, otherwise they take by representation." 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1981)
(amended 1984).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
190. See, e.g., Cupp v. Frazier's Heirs, 387 S.W.2d 328 (Ark. 1965).
191. See In re Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1972).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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A very strong argument can be made that Robbs itself needs to be overruled.
However, rather than forcing Oklahoma to endure another round of cases in which
the "proper" construction is debated, the Oklahoma legislature should solve the
problem by repealing the statute. Each construction of the first phrase of section
222 causes its own set of problems. While in the author's opinion there are fewer
irrational results if the half-blood relatives are always excluded, neither construction solves the ver major problem of excluding half-blood relatives not of the
blood in favor of whole blood relatives not of the blood.
The Robbs interlretation at least limits the circumstances under which section
222 will apply. Perhaps, given all the outdated unfairness inherent in the statute,
any interpretation that limits its application is a good result. However, at the same
time, the decision severely undermines any remaining possible reasonable basis for
the occasions when the half-blood relative will be excluded. Further, the Robbs
decision created an entirely new set of unanswered questions that only serve to
increase the confusion and increase the opportunity for misapplication of the
statute. As will be discussed in the next parts, these problems have increased
tenfold under the parentelic preference system of the amended version of section
213.'93
Clearly, as will be further discussed below, when faced with a case involving
certain relative patterns, the court will have to apply section 222 when the halfblood relatives are not in the same degree as the whole blood relatives.' When
that case is heard, the reasoning underlying the Robbs decision will be totally
undermined. Twenty-four years ago, Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in
Robbs stated the obvious solution when he said:
Former decisions of this court and the history of section 222 are
thoroughly discussed by Albert R. Matthews ... in 13 Oklahoma Law
Review 440-445. He appears to be of the view that the doctrine of
ancestral property should be abolished by the legislature. I agree that
the problem should be reviewed by our legislature.'
b) Questions Probably Settled by Inference
(1) The Statute Will Be Applied Even in the Absence of Relatives of the Blood
of the Ancestor
If the purpose of section 222 is to postpone inheritance by half-blood relatives
not of the blood in favor of relatives of the blood when ancestral property is
involved, logic would dictate that the statute would not come into play when the
only relatives are both whole and half-blood relatives of the other line. If, for
example, decedent's only relatives are a half-blood maternal cousin and a whole

193. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B) (Supp. 1995). See infra text accompanying notes 258-64.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 241-47.
195. Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1233 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson was referring to
a 1960 student case comment on the DeRoin decision.
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blood maternal aunt, there would be no valid reason to give paternal property to
the aunt and exclude the cousin.'"
Unfortunately, logic has seldom had any role in the interpretation of section 222.
It is fairly clear that the statute would exclude the half-blood cousin in the above
example. Indeed, the court so applied the statute in DeRoin v. Whitetail,"9
although this precise issue was not before the court. 9'
The conclusion that the Oklahoma court would apply section 222 to the "none
of the blood" situation is drawn by combining the court's ruling on the statute's
inapplicability to whole blood relatives and the language of the statute itself. In
In re Long's Estate,"9 the court stated as dictum:
It is important to observe that there is no requirement in the section
that the whole blood kindred to decedent must, in order to inherit, be
of the blood of decedent's ancestor; for the devolution to those of the
whole blood is governed by section 1617 [(current section 213)] which
section does not look to the source of decedent's title.' 0
This statement from the Long's Estate case was quoted with approval in
DeRoin." The result in DeRoin was to give the property to the paternal
grandfather and exclude the paternal half brother.
The first phrase of section 222 says that "kindred of half blood inherit equally
with those of the whole blood ... unless ...." Since whole blood relatives are
not required to be of the blood of the ancestor and since the statutory language
itself does not so limit them, there is nothing in section 222 to prevent the statute
from operating in this situation. It is the presence of the half-blood relative that
triggers the section. This is the very result that Justice Halley in his dissent in
DeRoin found so unreasonable.'
Admittedly, in DeRoin there was a half-blood uncle of the blood who was a
more remote degree of relation than the grandfather. He did not take when the half
brother was excluded, however, because the grandfather was the heir under the
statutory preference of section 213.' 3 The uncle's existence was really irrelevant

196. Under the current version of section 213, the aunt and the cousin would be in the same
statutory preference, issue of grandparents, and would both be heirs. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(2)(d)
(Supp. 1995). Under the pre-1984 version, the aunt, a third degree relative, would be the heir under the
next of kin preference. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1981) (amended 1984). The pre-1984 version is
preserved in the amended statute for deaths occurring before July 1,1985. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(A)
(Supp. 1995).
197. 312 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1957).
198. The issue in DeRoin was whether section 222 excluded whole blood relatives not of the blood.
There was a half-blood maternal relative, but he was not the heir when the paternal half blood relative
was excluded.
199. 67 P.2d 41 (Okla. 1936).
200. Id. at 44.
201. DeRoin, 312 P.2d at 969.
•202. Id. at 975 (Halley, J.,
dissenting).
203. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(sixth) (1981) (amended 1984) (preserved in original form by the
amendment at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(A)(sixth) (Supp. 1995)). The relevant preference was "next of kin
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once the court decided that section 222 did not exclude whole blood relatives who
were not of the blood. Under that ruling, the grandfather could take. Nevertheless,
the uncle's presence in the case does give the court an escape route when it is
faced with the "no relatives of the blood" issue, if the court chooses to distinguish
DeRoin. It would be regrettable if the court did choose to rely on that distinction
because doing so would only add another distinction without a rational difference
to a statute that already has proved to be irrational in far too many circumstances.
Interestingly, California did not apply its comparable statute in the'absence of
some relative of the blood.' California's rationale was that the purpose of the
statute was to favor those of the blood (at least in this instance). 5 In 1931,
California amended its half-blood statute to reflect this construction.2' The
amendment added the language "in favor of those who are" to the phrase "all those
not of the blood must be excluded."' In subsequent cases, the California court
interpreted that additional language as merely codifying the prior interpretation that
there must be someone of the blood before the statute would apply."' The
amendment did not mean that whole blood relatives not of the blood would not
share in the property from which the half-blood relatives not of the blood were
excluded by the existence of a relative of the blood.'
Accordingly, even though it is the author's opinion that it would be a distinction
without a difference, and the issue has been decided by inference, the Oklahoma
court could rely on California and distinguish away the prior answer. The court
has certainly done this when it changed its mind on other section 222 issues."0
It is another example of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding section 222 that
underscores the need for its repeal.
(2) Section 222 Transcends Section 213 Preferences
Section 222 states that "kindred of the half blood inherit equally ...
Clearly, in order to inherit, one usually has to be an heir.2" 2 A decedent's heirs
in equal degree." The grandfather, a second degree relative, was the only heir after the half brother was
excluded; the third degree: uncle did not share.
204. In re Edwards' Estate, 259 P. 440 (Cal. 1927) (per curiam).
205. Id at 441. In contrast, the California court severely limited the "favor the blood" purpose, both
when it interpreted its stazute as applying only to relatives in the same degree, In re Smith's Estate, 63
P. 729 (Cal. 1901) (per curium), and also when it interpreted the statute as not excluding whole blood
relatives who are not of the blood, In re Pearson's Estate, 42 P. 960, 961 (Cal. 1895).
206. CAL. PROB. CODE § 254 (1931) (repealed 1983).
207. Id.;
see In re Ryan's Estate, 133 P.2d 626, 630 (Cal. 1945).
208. Ryan's Estate, 133 P.2d at 630, 631.
209. In re Sayle's Estate, 8 P.2d 1009 (Cal. 1932).
210. See, e.g., In re Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1972).
211. 84 OKLA. STAT. §,222 (1991) (emphasis added).
212. This is not merely a sarcastic statement. In several other analogous situations, Oklahoma has
refused to allow relatives who were not otherwise heirs to take in place of a barred heir (or devise under
a will) because the statute (or language of the devise) did not precisely provide for their taking. See, e.g,,
84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (Supp. 1995) (providing that when killers of decedent barred, the property is
distributed "among the other heirs of the deceased person according to the laws of descent ....");84
OKLA. STAT. § 114 (1981) (amended 1987) (providing that divorce revokes provisions in will in favor
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are simply those persons who are designated by the state statute of descent and
distribution to take a decedent's intestate property." 3 A very foundational
question then is whether a half-blood heir can be excluded in favor of a whole
blood relative who would not be an heir if the half-blood relative were not
excluded by section 222.
The Oklahoma inheritance statute, section 213, designates the decedent's heirs
at law. This statute, like all intestate statutes, designates the heirs according to a
preferential scheme. Accordingly, if there are both brothers and sisters and also
issue of deceased brothers and sisters, the issue would also be heirs because they
are in the same statutory preference." 4 However, if decedent's relatives were an
aunt and the issue of brothers and sisters, the aunt would not be an heir. "Issue of
grandparents" (the aunt) are in a later preference than "issue of parents" (the
brothers' and sisters' children) under the current statute. 215
The section 222 question is this: if decedent's only relatives are a half-blood
maternal niece (third statutory preference under section 213 and a third degree
relative) and a paternal aunt (fourth statutory preference and a third degree
relative), would the aunt take paternal ancestral property to the exclusion of the
niece? They are in the same degree of relationship, which the Robbs case said was
key, even though the aunt is not otherwise an heir.
A strong argument can be made that section 222 should not operate if the result
is to "create" heirs by crossing statutory preferences. In other situations in which
a specific statute bars inheriting or taking under a will, the Oklahoma court has
consistently refused to treat the barred heir as predeceasing the decedent unless the
statute expressly provides for such treatment (the effect of treating the barred heir
as dead is often to make heirs of more remote relatives).2 6
The Oklahoma answer regarding section 222, however, is quite clearly that the
aunt would exclude the niece even though the aunt is not otherwise an heir.
Although the precise issue has never been raised in a reported case, this has been
the result in the majority of the reported Oklahoma cases. 7 Oklahoma has, at
least since the Robbs decision, focused solely on the degree of relationship; the
court has never focused on whether the competing parties were, in fact, heirs. In
the Robbs case itself, the maternal half brother and the children of deceased half

of spouse). Prior to the 1987 amendment correcting the oversight, the court in In re Freeman'sEstate,
651 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) refused to allow alternate devisees'who were given the
property "if the spouse predeceased" to take the property when the spouse was barred by the divorce

statute.
213. See, e.g., Moffett v. Conley, 163 P. 118, 120 (Okla. 1916).
214. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(2)(c) (Supp. 1995). Among collateral relatives, the first
preference is currently given to "issue of parents." The term "issue" is multigenemtional.
215. Id. § 213(B)(2)(c), (d). This is true under the current statute even though they are the same

degree of relation.
216. See supra note 212.
217. See In re Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1972); DeRoin v. Whitetail, 312 P.2d 967
(Okla. 1957); In re Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. 946 (Okla. 1930); Zweigel v. Lewis, 281 P. 787 (Okla.
1929); Hill v. Hill, 160 P. 1116 (Okla. 1916), overruled by In re Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. 946 (Okla.

1930).
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brothers were in a higher statutory preference than the paternal cousins. Although
in Robbs the maternal half-blood relatives were allowed to take, it was because
they were a closer degree of kindred than the cousins. The decision did not turn
on the fact that they were the only heirs based on section 213 preferences."'
That issue was not raised.
Further, prior to the Robbs decision limiting the statutes to same degree
situations, the relative patterns in Hill,219 Zweigel," Yahola's Heirship,221 and
DeRointe all fell across statutory heir preferences. In each case except Yahola's
Heirship, the lower preference whole blood relatives excluded the higher
preference heirs. In Yahola's Heirship, the property was not ancestral, so section
222 was not applied.
In none of these cases was this very foundational issue ever raised. Accordingly, once again, the Oklahoma Supreme Court could, when directly faced with
the question, limit section 222 to those who are otherwise heirs under section 213.
It is clear, however,.that it is not currently being so limited.
The Oklahoma approach (if it can be called an approach when a basic issue has
been ignored for ninety years by both the bar and the court), is consistent with that
of some other jurisdictions that had the identical statute. Washington, for example,
expressly held that the specific half-blood statute took precedence over the general
inheritance preference statute. m This approach is, however, contrary to the
position taken in California. California limited the application of its identical
statute to situations in which the whole blood relatives were in the same statutory
heir class as the half-blood relatives not of the blood.TM If the Oklahoma court
still considers itself bound by California precedent, it might well decide to once
again carefully distinguish all those prior situations in which the issue was not
decided.
c) Unanswered Issues
(1) Does Section 222 Operate When All Heirs Are of the Half Blood?
Certainly, as long as section 222 remains unrepealed, the absence of a whole
blood relative should make no difference to its application. For example, if
decedent has paternal ancestral property and her only relatives are a maternal half
brother and a paternal half brother, the maternal half brother should be excluded
from sharing in that property if the statute has any valid purpose. Perhaps, though,

218. See supra text accompanying notes 167-75. The half brother and children of deceased half
brothers in Estate of Robbs were in a higher preference (brothers and sisters and children of deceased
brothers and sisters) under the original version of section 213 than were the cousins (next of kin).
219. 160 P. at 1116 (half brother and grandmother).
220. 281 P. at 788 (half brother, grandfather).
221. 285 P. at 947 (half sister, paternal cousin).
222. 312 P.2d at 968 (half brother, grandfather).
223. In re Estate of Little, 721 P.2d 950, 958 (Wash. 1986).
224. In re Smith's Estate, 63 P. 729, 730 (Cal. 1901).
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that statement reflects the author's prejudice in favor of rational interpretations
rather than reflecting the "proper" interpretation of section 222.
No Oklahoma case has ever addressed the precise issue of whether section 222
would operate to exclude the half-blood relatives not of the blood of the ancestor
if the only competing claimants were half-blood relatives of the ancestor's blood.
Further, no reported case involves that particular relative pattern.
Given the court's prior insistence on a literal interpretation of both the language
and the punctuation of the statute,2 an argument can be made that the statute
would not apply in the absence of a whole blood relative. However, both the
Oklahoma court's reliance on California's interpretations of its statute and a similar
relative pattern that has appeared in some earlier Oklahoma cases indicate that the
court would probably apply the exclusion if asked to decide this issue.
In addition to the logic of its application to the situation demonstrated above, the
following facts support section 222's application to this problem. In In re Ryan's
Estate,' the California court stated that its statute excluded half-blood relatives
not of the blood in favor of both whole and half-blood relatives of the blood.'
The court rejected the respondents' argument that the statute would only operate
in favor of whole blood relatives.' While the relative pattern in the Ryan's
Estate case did include both whole and half-blood relatives, and the issue before
the court was different, 9 the emphatic dicta of the case was that the presence of
the whole blood relatives was not required for the statute to operateY Certainly,
if Oklahoma continues to rely on California interpretations, Ryan's Estate would
weigh heavily in favor of applying section 222 in the absence of whole blood
relatives.
Additionally, in at least one Oklahoma case decided prior to the Robbs decision,
the half-blood relative not of the blood was excluded in favor of the husband of
the decedent." The Robbs decision, which emphasized degree of relationship,
would change the outcome in that case." However, the conclusion in the
Thompson case that it is the presence of the half-blood relative that triggers section
222, and not the presence of a whole blood claimant, would appear to still be
valid. 3

225. See In re Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d 1228, 1231-32 (Okla. 1972).
226. 133 P.2d 626 (Cal. 1943).
227. Id. at 631.
228. Id. at 633.
229. The convoluted argument made by plaintiff and rejected by the court in Ryan's Estate was that
the statute would not exclude half-blood relatives not of the blood if there were also half-blood relatives
who would take; the statute would only exclude half bloods when all others were of the whole blood.

Id.
230. Id.
231. See Thompson v. Smith, 227 P. 77, 79, 82 (Okla. 1923)'
232. The Estate of Robbs case turned solely on degree of kinship. Since a husband is only an heirat-law and not a blood relative, he is not related by degree. There is no way, under the rule of Estate
of Robbs, that section 222 could exclude a half-blood relative in favor of a non-relative spouse.
233. Thompson, 227 P. at 81.
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The argument against the application of section 222 turns on construction of the
first phrase of the Statute: "Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with whole
bloods in the same degree unless .... "' In its determination that the statute
never excluded whole blood relatives, the Oklahoma court emphasized that the
subject of the statute was only "kindred of the half blood.""5 The court rejected
the argument that the "unless" clause referred to the entire first phrase and the
argument that the "all" who must be excluded included whole blood relatives not
of the blood.' Further, Oklahoma has held that section 222 is not an enabling
statute. 7 The court has fairly consistently stated that section 213 includes both
whole and half-blood relatives." Rights of half-blood relatives are not dependent
on section 222."
If section 222 is a limiting statute and if it only limits the rights of half-blood
relatives, it follows that it must only limit their rights in relation to whole blood
relatives. Otherwise, since they are not the subject of the statute, there is no reason
for the reference to whole blood relatives in the first phrase of section 222. If this
statute does not limit the rights of half-blood relatives in relation to whole bloods,
it should simply read: "If an inheritance came to the decedent by descent ....
half blood relatives not of the blood of the ancestor are postponed in favor of other
relatives in the same degree of relation."
In truth, the author believes that the argument against applying section 222 when
there ard no whole blood relatives is specious. It does, however, demonstrate the
problem with overreliance on grammatical construction. If this issue is ever raised,
the court may find itself having to back away from its insistence on literal
construction of section 222, just as it may have to do in order to deal with the
several other questions unanswered by the Robbs decision.
This author also believes that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has more important
work to do than wamting its time construing every word and phrase and comma of
an archaic statute that has already proven to be lacking valid purpose. In the final
analysis, regardless of which construction the court might adopt, this unanswered
question serves as one more example of why section 222 needs to be repealed.
The statute has been on the books since before statehood. The relative pattern used

234. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1991) (emphasis added).
235. DeRoin v. Whitetail, 312 P.2d 967, 970 (Okla. 1957).
236. Id.
237. Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1231.
238. E.g., Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1231; In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41, 44 (Okla. 1936).
239. E.g., Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1231; In re Long's Estate, 67 P.2d 41, 44 (Okla. 1936). At
various times, the issue of whether Section 222 is an enabling statute or a limiting statute has been
central to many of the interpretations of the statute by the Oklahoma court. This topic is fascinating in
itself, especially since, in the 1984 amendment to section 213, the legislature chose to alter the language
of the UPC model in the issue of parents preference. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(3) (1991)
(to descendants of decedent's parents or eitherof them) with 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(2)(c) (Supp. 1995)
(to issue of parents). One could argue that the only possible purpose for that alteration was deference
to the existence of section 222. That, however, might force section 222 to be an enabling statute, further
undermining its prior interpretations.
240. See infra text accompanying notes 241-49.
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in the example is not unusual. Intestate estates are distributed every day in
Oklahoma. While there are legitimate grounds for disagreement over which
relatives should be given statutory inheritance preferences, surely there can be no
disagreement that, when the heir patterns are identical, the property of decedents
should be distributed in the same way under the statute regardless of the judge or
attorneys involved. When a statute is so unclear that no one knows what it means,
only one outcome is certain: the statute will simply be ignored in some cases, and
in other cases it will be applied in many different ways to identically situated
relatives. That result is fundamentally unfair to everyone.
(2) Does Robbs Really Mean Only the Same Degree?
The Oklahoma court in the Robbs decision stated:
We therefore hold that our half-blood statute, 84 O.S.[] § 222, is
applicable only when the surviving half blood kindred and whole blood
kindred are related to decedent in the same degree, and that it does
not operate to disinherit nearer half blood kindred not of the blood of
the ancestor in favor of more remote whole blood kindred who are of
the blood of the ancestor."'
It is clear that if the whole blood kindred are a more remote degree of relation,
the nearer half-blood relatives are not excluded.u2 What is not clear, literally,
from the case is what happens if the half-blood relatives not of the blood are a
more remote degree of relation than the whole bloods. For example:
D is survived by a whole brother X and two paternal half-blood nephews, Y and
Z. Y and Z are the issue of D's deceased paternal half sister. The property was
given to decedent by his mother. Brother X is a second degree relation; Y and Z
are third degree. Had Ys and Zs parent still been living, the paternal half-sister
clearly would have been excluded because she was the same degree as X. Y and
Z, however, are not the same degree as X.
Obviously, this is another situation in which the section should be applied if
there is any legitimate purpose to it whatsoever. Yet, the whole and half-blood
relatives are not in the same degree, and, according to Robbs, section 222 only
applies when they are in the same degree.243
This is another of those many possible relative patterns that could force the
court to say, "We didn't mean what we said." If one examines the language of the
holding in Robbs, which is quoted above, the "out" that the court will use is very
predictable. The second phrase of the compound sentence stating the holding says
that section 222 "does not operate to disinherit nearer half blood kindred not of the
blood ... in favor of more remote whole blood kindred . ..."' Since the fact
pattern in Robbs dealt with more remote whole blood kindred, the precise holding

241.
242.
243.
244.

Estate of Robbs, 504 P.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
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really is that section 222 does not exclude half-blood relatives that are nearer in
degree.
While, analytically, the court would be correct if it adopted the nearer degree
interpretation of the Robbs opinion, that interpretation would completely undermine
the only reasoning that supported limiting the application of section 222 by degree
of relationship in the first place. The whole rationale of In re Smith's Estate, 5
the California case relied on in Robbs, was that the "in the same degree" language
of section 222 limited the application of the statute to relatives in the same
degree.' Nothing in the language of the statute supports an interpretation that
the statute applies unless the half-blood relatives are in a "nearer" degree. There
are just two possible interpretations of the language: it either always excludes those
not of the blood, or it only excludes when they are in the same degree as those of
the blood. 7 Yet, to not apply section 222 in a situation in which the half-blood
relatives not of the blood are more remote than the whole bloods, while at the
same time applying the section when they are of equal degree, would be utterly
absurd.
One additional argument that could be made for applying section 222 to the
more remote half-blood relatives, which possibly would not totally destroy the
rationale of Robbs, is the fact that the half-blood nephews in the example are
taking by representation through the deceased half sister who is of the same degree
as the whole blood brother. 2" On the particular facts of the example, this would
result in excluding the half-blood nephews. As long as all the claimants were in
the same parentelic preference, the result of this construction would be to always
exclude the half-blood relatives not of the blood. When the claimants were not all
in the same degree, they would always be claiming by representation through the
same generation. 9
Unfortunately, while the representation argument might yield a much more
logical result than the result currently reached under the rule in Robbs, there is no
precedent in either the prior Oklahoma cases or the California cases for this
construction. Putting that blush on the statute would require an entirely new
reading of section 222, and it would effectively destroy the reasoning, as well as
many of the holdings, of almost every Oklahoma decision that has construed the
statute. While the argument might be worth making in the appropriate case if the
legislature continues to ignore the need to repeal the half-blood statute, the only
truly rational solution is repeal.

245. 63 P. 729 (Cal. 1901).
246. Id. at 730.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
248. See 84 OKI.,. STAT. § 213(B)(2)(c), (B)(4) (Supp. 1995).
249. See 84 OKL.. STAT. § 213(B)(4) (Supp. 1995). Under the current statute, the representative
generation is always tte first generation in which someone is still living.
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IV. Additional Problems Caused by the 1985
Amendment to the Intestate Succession Statute
As this article has attempted to demonstrate, even if one supports the concept
of ancestral property remaining in the bloodline or if one still supports the ancient
prohibition against inheritance by half bloods, three primary factors prevent section
222 from effectively functioning as either an ancestral property statute or a halfblood statute in many cases. These factors are: (1) that the line of the ancestor can
change with each inheritance; (2) that the statute never excludes whole blood
relatives not of the blood of the ancestor; and (3) that the statute does not apply
if the half-blood relatives not of the blood are in a nearer degree of relation.
When these factors are coupled with the many unresolved questions concerning
section 222's construction, the circumstances in which section 222 will yield totally
unjustifiable results far outnumber the circumstances in which its bias against halfblood relatives could possibly be justified.' In the author's opinion, this was true
even when section 222 was being applied to the inheritance scheme that it was
designed to accompany. 1 Many of the problems inherent in section 222,
however, have been greatly exacerbated by the 1984 amendment to section 213.
The 1984 amendment completely changed the inheritance preferences among
collateral heirs. Under the original statute, the only collateral heirs who were given
a specific preference were brothers, sisters, and the children of deceased brothers
and sisters. 3 The children of deceased brothers and sisters were entitled to take
by representation under this preference only when there was a brother or sister still
living. ' The only other provision gave the estate to the "next of kin in equal
5

degree."1

Thus, under the traditional scheme, the only collateral relatives who ever would
take by representation were the children of deceased brothers or sisters. Once all
the brothers and sisters were dead, the heirs were determined solely on the basis
of degree of relation, with those claiming through the ancestor nearer to the
decedent given preference when relatives of the same degree were related through

250. The "justifiable" situation would be one in which the property is still in the line of the first
purchaser (not having switched lines by going first to a surviving spouse), and the competing heirs are
all whole and half-blood relatives of the blood in the same statutory heir preference. Almost every other
imaginable circumstance leads itself to unfairness.
251. The original versions of both section 222 and section 213 were "borrowed" from the Territorial
Code of 1877.
252. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 233, § 3, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 852, 854-57 (codified as amended
at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (Supp. 1995)).
253. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1981) (amended 1984) (preserved in the amendment in the original
form as 84 OKLA.STAT. § 213(A) (Supp. 1995)).
254. See Bates v. Huddleston, 293 P. 1047, 1049 (Okla. 1929).
255. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(sixth) (1981) (amended 1984) (preserved in the amendment as 84 OKLA.
STAT. § 213(A)(sixth) (Supp. 1995)).
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different ancestors.' The next of kin always took per capita; there was no
representation by more remote generations.
Accordingly, under the old inheritance scheme the only heir pattern in which
relatives of different degrees of relationship would be competing heirs was when
there were living brothers and sisters and children of deceased brothers and sisters.
Within that statutory preference, only in the specific instance when nieces and
nephews of the bood were opposed by decedent's half-blood brother or sister not
of the blood would the statute fail to exclude the half-blood relative. Only then
would taking by representation's relevance to section 222 ever come up.
Further, by definition, the brothers and sisters were in the closest degree of
relation among all the possible collateral relatives. The only lower inheritance
preference relative, who was also of the same degree and could exclude them
under section 222, was a grandparent. In the context of a statute that placed so
much emphasis on degree of relationship, the Robbs limitation of section 222
would often result in giving the property to the half-blood relatives who were the
heirs under section 213. The Robbs limitation would seldom give the ancestral
property to a more remote relative who was not otherwise an heir and who was
possibly a whole blood relative not of the blood. Accordingly, if the goal of the
court was to limit the circumstances under which section 222 would affect the
inheritance,' Robbs, in that respect, accomplished the goal.
When one attempts to apply section 222 to the new inheritance scheme,
however, it is very obvious that the half-blood statute, especially with its current
interpretations, is less compatible with the current inheritance statute. The 1984
version of section 213 is primarily based on parentelic preferences for collateral
inheritance. 8 The degree of relation is irrelevant to that scheme. Unlike the
UPC provision, which is the basis of the 1984 amendment, Oklahoma did retain
as a last option "next of kin in equal degree."" That option operates, however,
only if there are no issue of parents or grandparents.
It is quite possible under the current inheritance statute for a relative in the
second parentelic preference to be of the same degree, or of a closer degree, of
relation than the designated heirs in the first parentelic preference.' Additionally, under the parentelic system, representation by more remote generations in the
same preference is required. The preferences are given first to issue of parents and

256. See id.
257. See In re Yahola's Heirship, 285 P. 946, 948 (Okla. 1930) (holding that facts justifying
exceptions must be specific and certain).
258. Under a pazentelic preference scheme, priorities are based on the nearest ancestor to the
decedent. If there are no issue, the parents (the first parentelic line) are the heirs. If the parents are dead,
the issue of parents (the first parentela) are the heirs. The second parentelic line (grandparents or their
issue) are heirs only when no one exists in the first parentelic line. It is quite possible that a person who
was the "next of kin" under a degree system of collateral inheritance will not be the heir under a
parentelic system. For example, an uncle is a third degree relative; a grand niece is a fourth degree
relation. Under a degree system, the uncle would be the heir; under the parentelic system, the grand
niece is the heir.
259. 84 OKLA. SrAT. § 213(B)(2)(e) (Supp. 1995).
260. See supra note 258.
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then to issue of grandparents. Both of these factors increase the potential for
section 222 problem situations that were relatively rare under the original section
213.
Because representation is much more common under the amendment, it is no
longer true that all those who are otherwise heirs under section 213 will usually
be the same degree of relationship. Depending on whether it is a relative of the
blood or a half-blood relative not of the blood who is in the more remote
generation, section 222 will either exclude the half-blood heirs more often, or it
will not exclude them when there are actually relatives of the blood in the same
statutory preference. The unanswered question of the relevance, if any, of taking
by representation through one in the same degree has now become foundational to
a proper distribution of the estate among the heirs.
Further, when no brothers and sisters survive, but more remote issue of parents
do exist, there will be more occasions when half-blood heirs not of the blood are
being excluded by whole blood relatives not of the blood from the lower
grandparental preference. This will happen because the Robbs emphasis on degree
of relationship will create more occasions when the statute works across statutory
inheritance preferences since there are now more relatives in the lower preference
in the same degree as the section 213 heirs. Rather than limiting section 222's
application, the rule of Robbs, when applied to the current statute, expands its
application to favor more persons who are not otherwise heirs.
One additional perplexity created by amended section 213 demonstrates the
futility of trying to construe section 222 in any way that makes it compatible with
the inheritance scheme and further underscores the need for repeal. If the
decedent's nearest surviving relatives are issue of grandparents, and there are issue
in both the maternal and paternal lines, section 213 provides that the estate is first
divided into two equal shares, and one share is sent down each line."' Within
each line, that half of the estate is distributed independently of the distribution of
the other line's half share.
Assume that the decedent owns paternal ancestral property. It is very clear that
whole blood relatives not of the blood are not affected by section 222.2 Thus,
at least as long as there is one maternal whole blood relative, the property will
have to go through the initial division into equal halves without any consideration
being given to the source of the assets.' If a half-blood maternal relative of
equal or a more remote degree than any of the paternal relatives also exists,'

261. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(2)(d) (Supp. 1995).
262. DeRoin v. Whitetail, 312 P.2d 967, 973 (Okla. 1957).
263. If all the maternal relatives were half bloods and ifall were in the same degree or a more
remote degree than the paternal relatives, then all the maternal relatives would be excluded by section
222, and all the paternal property should go down the paternal side. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B)(2)(d)
(Supp. 1995). However, the presence of even a half-blood maternal relative who is a closer degree of
relation that the patemals (e.g., a maternal half-blood aunt and paternal cousins) will cause the property
to first be split between the two lines.
264. The scenario becomes even more perplexing if it is the whole blood maternal relative who is
the person of equal degree with the half-blood maternal relative. Now, the other unanswered question
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section 222 will exclude the half-blood maternal relative from sharing in the
paternal property. In this instance, however, none of the benefit of the exclusion
will flow to the relatives of the blood, even though in this case they are also heirs.
Because the distribution in each line is done independently of the distribution in
the other line, the half-blood relative will be excluded solely in favor of the whole
blood relative not of the blood.
Unlike the possibly unanswered question of whether section.222 would apply
in the absence of some relative of the blood,' there is very little room to argue
that it does not apply on these facts. Although the precise relative pattern differs,
this is very similar to the fact pattern in DeRoin. In DeRoin, there was a relative
of the blood, but he did not take because the statutory preference gave the property
to the grandparent who was not of the blood.'
If Oklahoma is, in fact, wedded to the ancient concepts so ineptly reflected in
section 222, it needs to draft an entirely new statute that always excludes both
whole and half-blood relatives not of the blood and also looks to the blood of the
first purchaser rather than the immediate ancestor. That statute should also
specifically state whether it is intended to apply across section 213 preferences.
If, on the other hand, Oklahoma has simply slept through the debate about halfblood statutes and is not aware of the problems of section 222, the statute should
be repealed.
Trying to apply an exclusion statute that turns on degrees of relationship to an
inheritance statute that ignores .degrees of relationship is a classic example of
trying to fit the proverbial square peg into the proverbial round hole. It simply
does not work! It is also an example of one of the problems that occurs when a
statute is amended without any consideration being given to its relation to other
statutes. In the absence of any legislative history in Oklahoma, there is no way to
know if the legislature even considered section 222 when it amended section
213.' 7 Given the additional problems created when the two statutes collide, one
would hope that retaining section 222 was not an intentional decision.

of whether there must be an excluding relative of the blood also comes into the picture.
265. See supra te.t accompanying notes 196-209.
266. DeRoin, 312 P.2d at 971.
267. There is one :;light indication in section 213 that hints that the legislature was aware of section
222. The UPC version of the first parentelic preference provides that "ifthere is no surviving descendant
or parent, to the descendants of the parents or either of them by representation." UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-103(3) (1991). Th. Oklahoma version omits the "or either of them" language. 84 OKLA. STAT.
§ 213(B)(2)(c) (1991). One can speculate that this was done to acknowledge the separate half-blood
statute (to prevent the argument that it was repealed by implication?); however, it can also be argued that
this omission turns section 222 into a needed enabling statute. The counter argument, of course, is that
it was felt that "or either of them" was unnecessary because the singular includes the plural and viceversa. The author's skeptical speculation would be that the Oklahoma drafters never thought about
section 222.
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Conclusion
The Oklahoma half-blood statute is an anachronism. Even if one can identify
certain situations in which it actually keeps the decedent's inherited property in the
family from which it came, both the occasions in which it discriminates irrationally
against half-blood relatives and also the occasions when it does not exclude them
when the only justification for the statute would indicate it should are far too
numerous to justify its existence. Additionally, the interpretations of the statute are
so misunderstood by the practicing bar and leave so many unanswered questions
that it is impractical to assume that the statute is being applied in the same manner
to identical estates. Section 222 has little practical value. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court should not be required to waste its time resolving the many unanswered
questions about its application that the amendment to section 213 has raised. No
construction that the court could adopt could possibly prevent all the irrational
results. Almost every jurisdiction that has adopted a "modernized" statute of
descent and distribution, especially one which is based on the UPC, has repealed
the jurisdiction's archaic half-blood statute at the same time. Either those states
recognized the incompatibility of the two statutes, or they recognized that the halfblood statute, regardless of the inheritance scheme to which it applied, was seldom
accomplishing any valid purpose and was frequently causing absurd results. It is
past time for the Oklahoma legislature to also recognize these facts and act
accordingly.
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